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The Road 'Round Edmond: Steering




Consider this hypothetical: A couple drives home after dining out
together. A few miles from home, they see police lights and a sign that
reads: "Sobriety checkpoint 1/4-mile ahead. Prepare to Stop." The
driver, relieved that he passed on wine with dinner, slows to answer the
expected questions about sobriety and license and registration. To the
couple's surprise, however, after the driver answers these questions
satisfactorily, the police circle the couple's vehicle with a drug-sniffing
dog, ask them whether they have any drugs or other contraband in the
vehicle, and shine a flashlight through the vehicle's windows into its
interior. When the couple is allowed to continue, the passenger asks as
he looks back at the checkpoint, "What was that all about? Can they just
do that?"
Not an outlandish question. It reflects the "well established
[principles] that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,"' and that "[a]
search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of
Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. J.D. magna
cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 1994. I am very grateful to my colleague,
Mary Pat Treuthart, for her thoughtful feedback. Thanks also to Leslie Hayes, Kristin
Sullivan and Andrew Gabel for their research assistance.
1. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."2  In this hypothetical, the
police seized and questioned the couple without any evidence that either
one had engaged in criminal activity. A clear Fourth Amendment
violation? Not necessarily.
The United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the suspicionless
seizure of motorists at vehicle checkpoints designed to advance
important governmental interests. For example, the Court has upheld "a
fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens",3 and
"a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road."4
The Court also has "suggested that a similar type of roadblock with the
purpose of verifying drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations would be
permissible." 5 These suspicionless seizures have been upheld because, in
the context of a uniform and announced checkpoint procedure, these
specific governmental interests outweigh motorists' privacy interests.6
Not surprisingly, the police over time expanded their use of suspicionless
checkpoints to investigate motorists for illegal drugs and other traditional
criminal activity.7
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,8 however, the Supreme Court
invalidated a drug-interdiction checkpoint where the police stopped and
2. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
3. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-64 (1976)
(upholding immigration checkpoints).
4. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37; see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 450-51 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints).
5. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38; see also Delaware v. Prowse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)
("Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible
alternative."). One might assume that the Court in Edmond would not have referred to its
own "suggestion" in Prowse unless it means to stand by it in the future, and courts
certainly have operated under this assumption in evaluating license and registration
checkpoints. See, e.g., Briggs v. State, 741 So. 2d 986, 989 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(upholding checkpoint "serving principally as a check for drivers licenses and vehicle
registrations").
6. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-55 (upholding sobriety checkpoint and weighing
governmental interest in combating drunk driving against degree of intrusion on
individual motorists).
7. See, e.g., Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 998-99 (D.C. 1991) (rejecting
checkpoint designed to intercept drugs); State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 572-73 (Mo.
1996) (en banc) (upholding narcotics interdiction checkpoint); Wilson v. Commonwealth,
509 S.E.2d 540, 541, 543 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (accepting narcotics interdiction as a valid
public interest supporting checkpoint); cf Norwood v. Bain, 166 F.3d 243, 244-45 (4th
Cir. 1999) (upholding checkpoint to inspect for weapons at entry to motorcycle rally);
Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1996) (evaluating checkpoint
designed to prevent drive-by shootings related to area drug activity, and noting that
"checkpoints similar to the one here had been effectively used in the past by the New
York City Police"); People v. Cascarado, 587 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1992) (upholding auto-larceny checkpoint).
8. 531 U.S. 32.
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questioned motorists and examined vehicles with a drug-sniffing dog.
9
The Court distinguished this narcotics checkpoint from the suspicionless
checkpoints it had previously upheld because of the narcotics
checkpoint's primary purpose: "the ordinary enterprise of investigating
crimes."' 0  With a seizure designed to advance this traditional law
enforcement purpose, the Court "decline[d] to suspend the usual
requirement of individualized suspicion,"'1 concluding: "[w]e cannot
sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present
possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given
motorist has committed some crime."
12
Edmond thus makes clear that the police cannot institute a
checkpoint that pursues general crime control as its primary purpose.1
3
9. Id. at 35. In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), the Supreme Court made
clear that the presence of the drug-sniffing dog did not prompt the Court's conclusion in
Edmond that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 408-10 (holding
that brief exterior examination of a lawfully stopped vehicle by a drug-sniffing dog does
not constitute a search, nor does it unreasonably expand the scope of the motorist's
seizure if it occurs during the time reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
initial stop). Dissenting in Edmond, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority's
holding was influenced by this fact. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("The State's use of a drug-sniffing dog, according to the Court's holding,
annuls what is otherwise plainly constitutional under our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: brief, standardized, discretionless roadblock seizures of
automobiles ... ").
10. Edmond, 531 U.S. at44.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Edmond distinguishes between checkpoints designed "to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing," id. at 41, and checkpoints "set up to thwart an imminent
terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a
particular route," id. at 44, which "the Fourth Amendment almost certainly would
permit." Id. Compare Caballes, 543 U.S. at 424-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing drug-sniffing dog inspections from bomb-sniffing dog inspections,
highlighting the extreme public safety interest at stake with the latter) with id. at 417 n.7
(Souter, J., dissenting) (highlighting the unique threat inherent in explosive, chemical or
biological threats and noting "that what is a reasonable search depends in part on
demonstrated risk"). Edmond, of course, predated September 11. Some courts since
September 11 have treated antiterrorism checkpoints as outside of traditional "crime
control." See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at
*17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005), aff'd 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding New York
Police Department's program of random passenger bag searches in subway system,
noting that in attempting to keep terrorist bombs out of the subway system, the
"[p]rogram addresses a problem well beyond the 'normal need for law enforcement' or a
'general interest in crime control'); Cassidy v. Chertoff, No. 05-1835-cv, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29388, at *38-39 (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2006) ("[T]he prevention of terrorist
attacks on large vessels engaged in mass transportation and determined by the Coast
Guard to be at heightened risk of attack constitutes a 'special need.' Preventing or
deterring large-scale terrorist attacks present problems that are distinct from standard law
enforcement needs and indeed go well beyond them."); cf United States v. Green, 293
F.3d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding checkpoint at open military base to further
national security interest in protecting military bases from vehicle-bound domestic and
2006]
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Yet, Edmond does not resolve whether a secondary programmatic
purpose of crime control would invalidate a checkpoint with a non-crime
control primary purpose. 14 Edmond also does not provide lower courts
with a clear analytical framework for identifying a checkpoint's "primary
programmatic purpose" when a checkpoint advances several law
enforcement objectives, some related to crime control and some not-
such as the hypothetical checkpoint that introduced this article.1 5 Nor did
international terrorist attack); Abraham Abramovsky, Counter-Terrorist Checkpoints in
N.Y City: Are They Constitutional?, N.Y.L.J., p.4 (April 30, 2003) (analyzing "whether
an orange alert creates an inference of heightened risk similar to that observed by the
Green court, which would render counter-terrorist enforcement distinct from ordinary
crime control activities"); Michael T. Morley, To Catch a Killer: Roadblocks and the
Fourth Amendment, 18 CRIM. JUST. 26, 28 (Fall 2003) ("Apprehension of a particular,
dangerous felon believed to be fleeing the area of a recently committed crime is a special
need distinguishable from the state's generalized interest in crime control.").
This article focuses on vehicle checkpoints generally, and does not address whether
antiterrorism checkpoints should be viewed as having a non-crime control objective
under traditional suspicionless checkpoint jurisprudence, or whether they instead should
be judged under a more flexible reasonableness matrix. For a very comprehensive
student Note reviewing suspicionless antiterrorism police action in metropolitan subway
systems see Charles J. Keeley III, Note, Subway Searches: Which Exception to the
Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of Mass
Transit Passengers to Prevent Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 3231 (2006). Mr.
Keeley argues that "none of the eligible approaches can be used to justify the subway
searches without injuring the consistency of search and seizure jurisprudence or
undermining the protections of the Fourth Amendment" and recommends "a sui generis
exception for antiterrorism mass transit searches in order to enable communities to
defend themselves from this unique threat." Id. at 3232. Mr. Keeley adds his interesting
view that "the political process adequately safeguards privacy when a search program
equally affects a majority of a community and cedes no discretion to officials in selecting
whom to search." Id. at 3232-33; see also id. at 3293-94 (arguing that they can be
considered "democratically reasonable"). This representation reinforcement-type theory
of the Fourth Amendment is reminiscent of the work of Professors Tracey L. Meares and
Dan M. Kahan. See, e.g., Tracey Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated
Procedural Thinking: A Critique ofChicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 209-
11; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler
and Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 253-59 (discussing theory of "community
burden sharing").
14. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2 ("[W] need not decide whether the State may
establish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver
sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics.").
15. See Leslie P. Butler, Note, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: An Unprecedented
Use of "Primary" Purpose Leaves Wide Open the Door for "Secondary" Problems, 46
ST. Louis U. L.J. 175, 207 (2002) ("The questions that this 'primary' purpose analysis
has left are: .. . what constitutes a 'primary' purpose and who is to determine that .... ?");
Jonathan Kravis, Comment, A Better Interpretation of "Special Needs" Doctrine after
Edmond and Ferguson, 112 YALE L.J. 2591, 2595 (2003) ("Edmond ... suggest[s] that a
special needs search is one in which the non-law-enforcement purpose is 'primary,' but
offer[s] little guidance about how to distinguish primary from secondary purposes."); cf
D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 455, 496 (2001) ("Edmond [does not] reach[] the more vexing question of what
evidence can be used to infer purpose when the government contends that its immediate
[Vol. 111:2
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the Court "express [any] view on the question whether police may
expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order to
detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car."'
' 6
These questions left open by Edmond implicate more than doctrinal
Fourth Amendment challenges. Checkpoints that involve the seizure of
law-abiding motorists in the absence of any suspicion of criminality are
arguably "the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp
out." 7 In Edmond, the Supreme Court recognized the real-world impact
of broadly sanctioned suspicionless checkpoints on individual privacy
interests: "Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to
serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would
do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of
American life."' 18 The exact meaning of the Court's primary purpose test
in Edmond, therefore, will dictate how far from "routine" suspicionless
criminal inquiries in fact will remain.
With this broader concern in mind, this article attempts to make
sense of Edmond in the context of "multi-purpose" checkpoints:
checkpoints that, like the hypothetical checkpoint that opened this article,
advance an approved checkpoint agenda, but on some level also advance
a "'general interest in crime control." '19 Part II of the article evaluates
Edmond's primary purpose test and when crime control agendas will
render a multi-purpose checkpoint presumptively unreasonable.20 This
purpose in instituting an investigative practice is something other than (or in addition to)
pure crime control.").
16. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2.
17. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2203 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
19. Id. at 40 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n. 18 (1979)).
20. Interestingly, some courts appear to have viewed Edmond as falling under the
Supreme Court's "special needs" doctrine because of the requirement of a non-crime
control primary purpose. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001)
(explaining origins and nature of the "special needs" test); United States v. Kincade, 379
F.3d 813, 825 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (referring to Edmond as one of the Supreme
Court's "recent 'special needs' cases"); id. at 853 n.9 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(discussing "special needs" doctrine, and opining that Edmond explains that Sitz and
related cases "were special needs cases because they involved suspicionless search
programs 'whose primary purpose was [not] to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing'). In Sitz, however, the Supreme Court rejected a "special needs" analysis
of checkpoint programs and instead applied the balancing test utilized in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See
Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990). Edmond's analysis
itself raises questions about the proper doctrinal framework to apply to checkpoint
programs. For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent criticized the majority's
application of the special needs test, see Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53-56 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority improperly applied the special needs test because in
Sitz "[w]e have already rejected an invitation to apply the non-law-enforcement primary
purpose test that the Court now finds so indispensable"), yet the majority in Edmond
referred to special needs and administrative search cases separately from its checkpoint
2006]
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part first considers whether a multi-purpose checkpoint with a lawful
primary purpose and secondary purpose of crime control violates
Edmond. Because the weight of authority so far indicates that a
secondary purpose of crime control will not upset a checkpoint with a
lawful primary purpose, Part II next reviews the developing models for
isolating and weighing a checkpoint's programmatic objectives to
identify its true "primary purpose."
Part III examines the back-end inquiry under Edmond of case-
specific reasonableness, 2' and how this inquiry can ensure that
checkpoints with secondary crime control objectives do not become de
facto crime control checkpoints. Several decisions from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals develop and illustrate this principle. These decisions
collectively eschew a secondary-purpose analysis in evaluating
checkpoint validity, and instead strictly evaluate the physical duration of
a checkpoint stop. Part IV of the article synthesizes the different
approaches explored in Parts II and III into a workable framework for
evaluating suspicionless vehicle checkpoints. This framework
effectively balances individuals' privacy interests in freedom from
suspicionless criminal inquiries against law enforcement's interest in
pursuing the limited programmatic checkpoint objectives of which the
decisions. See id. at 37-38; see also Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201 n.4 (2006) (referring to
"programmatic and special needs searches"); id. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(referring to "programmatic searches.., required to meet a 'special need'); People v.
Johnson, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 587, 604 n.22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("We perceive some overlap
between the analyses."); Keeley, supra note 13, at 3256 ("The relationship among
administrative inspections, roadblock checkpoint seizures, and the 'special needs'
searches is not settled.").
In Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), however, the Supreme Court clarified the
precise test applicable to suspicionless vehicle checkpoints. First, a court must determine
that the checkpoint satisfies Edmond's non-crime control primary purpose inquiry, or else
any seizure pursuant to the checkpoint will prove "presumptively" unreasonable. See id.
at 426 (discussing the "Edmond-type presumptive rule of unconstitutionality"). Second,
even if the checkpoint programmatically does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment,
"[tihat does not mean the stop is automatically, or even presumptively, constitutional. It
simply means that we must judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the
basis of the individual circumstances." Id. at 426, (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, and Sitz,
496 U.S. at 450-55); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80 n. 17 (explaining two-part analysis
in "special needs" cases). For a critique of Lidster's "clarification" of Edmond's rule as
truly a watering-down of Edmond's presumptive requirement of individualized suspicion,
see George M. Dery III & Kevin Meehan, Making the Roadblock a "'Routine Part of
American Life: " Illinois v. Lidster's Extension of Police Checkpoint Power, 32 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 105, 124 (2004) ("In choosing to avoid Edmond, the Lidster Court aimed to
marginalize its holding as creating an 'Edmond-type presumptive rule of automatic
unconstitutionality.' Such a characterization hardly fit with the original reasoning offered
in Edmond itself.").
21. See Lidster, 540 U.S at 426 (explaining that if a checkpoint does not
programmatically run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, its reasonableness and
constitutionality must be determined based on the individual circumstances).
[Vol. 111:2
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Supreme Court has approved.
II. Primary Purpose and Crime Control
In Edmond, Indianapolis operated vehicle checkpoints in an effort to
interdict unlawful drugs.22 At these checkpoints, drivers encountered a
sign that read, "NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT __ MILE AHEAD,
NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP., 23 About thirty
police officers would operate a checkpoint, which was operated generally
during daylight hours.24  Police officers randomly would stop a
predetermined number of vehicles, advise the occupants that they were
being detained briefly at a drug checkpoint and ask the driver for license
and registration. 25 An officer further would look for signs of impairment.
and examine the vehicle from the outside. A narcotics detection dog also
would walk around the exterior of the vehicle.26 The average checkpoint
stop lasted two to three minutes or less. 27 Edmond was stopped at a
checkpoint and he sued to enjoin Indianapolis from enforcing the
checkpoint program, claiming a violation of the Fourth Amendment.28
The District Court denied Edmond's request for a preliminary injunction
but a divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
checkpoint contravened the Fourth Amendment.29
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the
checkpoint because it "unquestionably ha[d] the primary purpose of
interdicting illegal narcotics. 3 °  This subjective analysis of law
enforcement motivations in establishing a suspicionless checkpoint
departs from the purely objective analysis generally applicable to police
action under the Fourth Amendment, where "[s]ubjective intentions play
no role in [the] analysis.",31 Edmond instead expressly invites courts to
examine whether "the primary purpose of... [a] checkpoint program is
22. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
23. Id. at 35-36.
24. See id. at 35.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 36.
28. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000).
29. See id.
30. Id. at 40.
31. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Brigham City v.
Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) ("AM action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.' The officer's subjective
motivation is irrelevant." (citation omitted)); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153
(2004) ("Our cases make clear that an arresting officer's state of mind.., is irrelevant to
the existence of probable cause."); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72 (2001)
(applying Whren to custodial arrest).
2006]
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to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 32  The Court
emphasized, moreover, "that the Indianapolis program [could not be]
justified by its lawful secondary purpose of keeping impaired motorists
off the road and verifying licenses and registrations." 33 If a checkpoint's
validity may rest upon its secondary purpose, the Court reasoned, "law
enforcement would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any
purpose so long as they also included a license or sobriety check. 34
Courts instead must "examine the available evidence to determine the
primary purpose of the checkpoint program.,
35
The Court stressed, however, that "the purpose inquiry in this
context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an
invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene. 36
Suspicionless checkpoints are evaluated at a programmatic level because,
to prove constitutionally reasonable, they are designed to operate under
clear guidelines that constrain the discretion of individual officers
executing the checkpoint.37 Since the program, not individual officer
discretion, controls the checkpoint's execution the purpose inquiry
properly i's limited to the program itself. Consequently, so long as a
checkpoint has a lawful primary programmatic purpose-such as
immigration, sobriety, or license and registration status38-- the officers
32. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
33. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Id. Some courts had engaged in a similar analysis prior to Edmond. See, e.g.,
United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Morales-
Zamora, 974 F.2d 149, 152-53 (10th Cir. 1992); Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990,
997-99 (D.C. 1991); cf State v. DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 2000) (analyzing
pretextual checkpoint under state law).
36. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (emphasis added); see also Brigham City, 126 S. Ct. at
1948 (noting that under Edmond, "this inquiry is directed at ensuring that the purpose
behind the program is not 'ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control').
37. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (holding that a checkpoint "seizure
must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers"); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (requiring
a "substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion"); cf. In
re Muhammed F., 722 N.E.2d 45, 47-52 (N.Y. 1999) (rejecting roving patrol taxi safety
stops because of absence of sufficient guidelines limiting officer discretion and extent of
intrusion).
38. The Supreme Court has "not limit[ed] the purposes that may justify a checkpoint
program to any rigid set of categories," other than to prohibit "a program whose primary
purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control."
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44; cf Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (finding
checkpoint designed to gather information from witnesses of a past crime to have a non-
crime control primary police objective); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 n.18 (rejecting
"controlling auto thefts" as a valid primary purpose for checkpoint); United States v.
Green, 293 F.3d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding checkpoint at open military base
to further national security interest in protecting military bases from vehicle-bound
[Vol. 111:2
THE ROAD 'ROUND EDMOND
implementing the checkpoint may harbor virtually any other individual
agenda when stopping and questioning motorists.39
The Court in Edmond, however, left two significant holes in its
primary purpose test. First, the Court declined to address whether a
secondary programmatic purpose of crime control will upset a
checkpoint that has a lawful primary purpose.40  And if a secondary
domestic and international terrorist attack); People v. Jackson, 782 N.E.2d 67, 72 n.2
(N.Y. 2002) (analyzing checkpoint allegedly designed to prevent taxi and livery cab
carjackings and robberies, and concluding, "this is not the occasion to decide whether,
had that been the primary objective, it would meet the requirements of [Edmond]");
People v. Abad, 771 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (N.Y. 2001) (upholding "roving checkpoint"
stops of livery taxis whose drivers participate in voluntary program with objective of
preventing crimes against livery taxi drivers). But cf State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505,
512-13 (Tenn. 2006) (rejecting entry checkpoint to public housing complex under
Edmond that was designed to prevent crimes by trespassers). This article does not
attempt to identify exactly what does and does not qualify as "crime control." See
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424 ("[T]he phrase 'general interest in crime control' does not refer
to every 'law enforcement' objective." (construing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 n. 1)).
39. See Brigham City, 126 S. Ct. at 1948 (emphasizing that the Edmond
programmatic purpose inquiry "has nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of
the individual officer conducting the search"); cf United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261
F.3d 425, 433-34 and n.26 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that under Edmond, "[w]e do not
inquire into the motives of individual [officers] in performing stops"). An exception to
this individual motive limitation may arise if officers execute a checkpoint with a
discriminatory purpose. Cf Lidster, 540 U.S. at 428 ("[T]here is no allegation here that
the police acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner while questioning
motorists during stops."). But cf Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46 (citing United States v.
Bond, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (permitting subjective inquiry solely at the programmatic
level even with a suspicionless search or seizure). If an officer executes a checkpoint
with discriminatory motives, it is unclear whether those motives would be evaluated
Under the Fourth Amendment, or under an independent equal protection claim, cf Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (noting that "the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race," and that "the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the
Equal Protection Clause"), or perhaps both. The Supreme Court has not considered
whether a criminal defendant who demonstrates an equal protection violation may invoke
the exclusionary rule. See State v. Segars, 799 A.2d 541, 549 (N.J. 2002) ("The
rationales that support the suppression of evidence under [search and seizure provisions],
namely, deterrence of impermissible investigatory behavior and maintenance of the
integrity of the judicial system, apply equally, if not more so, to cases of racial targeting."
Thus, "if race is the sole motivation underlying [a police investigation], it is illegal and
the evidence resulting from a subsequent stop must be suppressed." (citation omitted));
cf Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an
Exclusionary Rule under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107, 1137-
41 (2001) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should include an exclusionary rule
independent of the Fourth Amendment if police investigate with racially discriminatory
motives). But cf United States v. Barker, 69 F. App. 208, 213 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
circuit's previous holding suggesting equal protection exclusionary rule, but declining to
decide issue).
40. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2 (declining to address "whether the State may
establish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver
sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics").
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purpose does not, Edmond still fails to provide courts with a precise
methodology for divining a discrete primary purpose with a checkpoint
that pursues multiple objectives. Since Edmond, these questions have
generated increasing focus as courts and commentators have grappled
with the Court's primary purpose test.
41
A. Secondary Crime Control Purposes: Presumptively Unreasonable?
As the hypothetical that opened this article illustrates, many
checkpoint programs possess a lawful purpose or purposes, but also
pursue an additional agenda of investigating crime. This crime control
agenda may manifest itself in different ways. For instance, the crime
control agenda expressly may be part of the checkpoint program; a
Sergeant or other supervisor at the scene may direct officers to look for
certain indications of wrongdoing while executing the checkpoint
program; or individual officers simply may keep a conscious eye out for
evidence of crime. These examples present a maze of potential law
enforcement purposes for a court to interpret and weigh, which perhaps
explains why a court would not inquire into a checkpoint's "purpose" at
all.42
But Edmond calls for this inquiry and the Court repeatedly referred
to it as one of determining a checkpoint's "purpose., 43  The inquiry,
however, is not quite one of purpose in the classic criminal law mens rea
sense: no one disputes in these cases that the police intentionally
established and executed a checkpoint to achieve the checkpoint's
goals.44 Rather, Edmond asks courts to identify and weigh those goals
41. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 15, at 207 (questioning what becomes of a
checkpoint "where the secondary purpose of a checkpoint program is to prevent the flow
of narcotics, and the primary purpose is to check for driver's license and the like?");
Keeley, supra note 13, at 3276 (commenting that the Supreme Court's special needs
jurisprudence "leaves unsettled the question whether a search that primarily focuses on
achieving a non-law enforcement purpose-such as public safety-might still qualify as
a special need even though a secondary purpose is to gather evidence for use in criminal
prosecutions"). This grappling may intensify now that the Supreme Court has applied a
"primary purpose" test in another criminal procedure context. See Davis v. Washington,
126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006) (adopting a primary purpose test under the Confrontation
Clause for evaluating hearsay statements given in response to police interrogation).
42. Cf Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46 (recognizing "the challenges inherent in a purpose
inquiry").
43. See id. at 41-48.
44. Cf United States v. -Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) ("'[Plurpose' corresponds
loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent .. "); United States v. Armenta-
Fiscal, 185 F. App'x 585, 587 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Specific intent is the equivalent of acting
with 'purpose' under the Model Penal Code, meaning a defendant must 'consciously
desir[e] [the] result."' (alterations in original)); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231
F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In general, 'purpose' corresponds to the concept of
specific intent .... ); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
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themselves, or, in other words, the reasons why the police instituted the
checkpoint. Thus, the inquiry more accurately may be described as one
of police motives.45  Professor LaFave's treatise cites a helpful
articulation of the intent-motive distinction recently offered by a
Michigan appellate court, that "'[m]otive' is the moving power which
impels to action for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a
particular means to effect such result. 'Motive' is that which incites or
stimulates a person to do an act."46  Under this view, Edmond's
"purpose" inquiry would seem more appropriately framed as an inquiry
into police motives for establishing a checkpoint program.
And, in other motive-inquiry contexts, the Supreme Court has
observed the difficulty of divining a discrete "primary" purpose to
conduct. For example, the Court has noted that "[r]arely can it be said
that a legislature of administrative body operating under a broad mandate
made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a
particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one. 'A7 Of course, a
(defining "purpose" to mean the "conscious object to engage in the conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result").
45. Cf League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2632-33
(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring jointly to "the
motive for redistricting" and "the relevant intent-in this case a purely partisan intent");
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (equating "motive" with the "reason"
for acting); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. 492 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (examining whether challenged decisions were "motivated" by a "particular
purpose"); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641-42 (1947) (looking to reasons for
charged traitor's support of his son's treasonous actions as "proof of adherence to the
enemy"). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3(a), at 257 (4th ed.
2003) [hereinafter LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW] (noting the "disagreement as to what is
meant by the word 'motive' and how it differs from 'intention,' a matter which has
caused the theorists considerable difficulty for years").
46. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 45, § 5.3(a), at 257 n.8 (quoting People v.
Hoffman, 570 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)).
47. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287
(2004) (observing in a voter redistricting case that
Vague as a "predominant motivation" test might be when used to evaluate
single districts, it all but evaporates when applied statewide. Does it mean, for
instance, that partisan intent must outweigh all other goals--contiguity,
compactness, preservation of neighborhoods, etc.-statewide? And how is the
statewide "outweighing" to be determined? If three-fifths of the map's districts
forgo the pursuit of partisan ends in favor of strictly observing political-
subdivision lines, and only two-fifths ignore those lines to disadvantage the
plaintiffs, is the observance of political subdivisions the "predominant" goal
between those two?).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989) (noting in Title VII employment
discrimination context that "[w]here a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate
and illegitimate motives ... it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate
reason was 'the "true reason"' for the decision" (citation omitted)); McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973) ("The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough,
without a requirement that primacy be ascertained. Legislation is frequently
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police department is not a legislature, and perhaps not quite an
administrative body. But, police departments similarly "are properly
concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations" in
choosing courses of action.48 Checkpoints provide a clear illustration of
this premise, as the police must weigh a myriad of concerns and interests
when deciding whether, where, when and how to institute a particular
checkpoint.49  Yet, the Supreme Court has not rejected "primary" or
"predominant" purpose analysis in all contexts, 50 and Edmond directs
courts to isolate and prioritize police objectives to determine a
challenged checkpoint's primary and secondary purposes. 51
If a "secondary" purpose under Edmond means only that the true
police objective is crime control, for which the asserted primary purpose
serves as a pretext, Edmond makes the answer easy: the checkpoint is
invalid.52  Conversely, if crime control constitutes only an incidental
objective to a checkpoint, an understood potential "spin-off' effect,
53
Edmond also seemingly makes the answer clear: "[o]ur holding ... does
not impair the ability of police officers to act appropriately upon
information that they properly learn during a checkpoint stop justified by
multipurposed: the removal of even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the
consensus of legislative judgment supporting the statute." (citation omitted)).
48. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 979-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(examining full range of police interests prompting checkpoint program).
50. See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734-36
(2005) (embracing primary purpose analysis in First Amendment context); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (employing predominant purpose analysis in claim
challenging voting districts).
51. The Supreme Court recently adopted a "primary purpose" test in Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), to govern the admissibility of "testimonial" hearsay
under the Confrontation Clause:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
Id. at 2273-74. Regardless of whether this test ultimately requires assessment of police
motives, the Court provided no clearer methodology for how courts should identify
primary versus subordinate objectives than the Court provided in Edmond.
52. Cf McCreary County, Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2735-36 (noting that a primary purpose
cannot be a "sham" purpose that is "merely secondary to a [prohibited] objective");
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 n.5 (1989) (declining to
decide whether "routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the
administrative scheme would give rise to an inference of pretext").
53. Cf Duncan v. United States, 629 A.2d 1, 5 n.6 (D.C. 1993) (discussing the
"'benefit from the 'spin-off effect of an otherwise constitutional law enforcement
program... (quoting Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 997 (D.C. 1991)).
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a lawful primary purpose, even where such action may result in the arrest
of a motorist for an offense unrelated to that purpose. 54 Indeed, this
"spin-off' effect can be said of almost any police work, even the most
benevolent, as diligent cops keep an eye out for trouble, even when
providing public services or just offering directions.5 Edmond does not
require the police to blind themselves to obvious evidence of crime as a
trade-off to instituting a checkpoint, or even to swear off non-intrusive
curiosity, many times the genesis of solid arrests. 6
The answer under Edmond does not prove so obvious, however,
when "secondary" instead means that crime control assumes more than
fringe-benefit status by consuming actual programmatic resources at a
checkpoint, but at the same time falls short of being the true, singular
purpose behind the checkpoint. The hypothetical that opened this article
exemplifies this sort of checkpoint: a sobriety checkpoint where the
police inspected vehicles with drug-sniffing dogs and a flashlight and
asked questions of motorists relating to classic crime control interests in
addition to sobriety detection. Before courts meaningfully can approach
the question of how to discern which objective, if any, accurately can be
termed "primary" and "secondary," courts must consider what to make
of "secondary" crime control purposes at all, since Edmond expressly
leaves this question unresolved.57
The first potential answer may lie in the Supreme Court's existing
pretext jurisprudence. In rejecting a Fourth Amendment pretext
argument in Whren v. United States,5 8 the Supreme Court highlighted the
role of individualized suspicion,59 which establishes an objective, and
thus reasonable, basis for police action regardless of any ulterior police
60motives. Checkpoint stops, by contrast, inherently lack the
54. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (emphasis added).
55. Cf, e.g., People v. Molnar, 774 N.E.2d 738, 741-42 & 742 n.4 (N.Y. 2002)
(upholding application of emergency exception to search warrant requirement even when
police may suspect that they will find evidence of crime, if they enter "for a legitimate,
benevolent purpose distinct from crime-fighting," and the desire to search for evidence
"'was not the primary motivation for the search' (quotation omitted)).
56. In rejecting an "any" prohibited motive approach, this latter position roughly
parallels the analysis in some other mixed-motive contexts, under which a challenged
purpose "must be a substantial factor in bringing about the [action]." In re M.S., 896
P.2d 1365, 1377 (Ca. 1995) (reviewing motive element of bias crime against claim of
"multiple concurrent motives").
57. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2 ("[W]e need not decide whether the State may
establish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver
sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics.").
58. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
59. See id. at 817-18 (explaining that probable cause "afford[s] the 'quantum of
individualized suspicion' necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently
constrained").
60. See id. at 814 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness'
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individualized suspicion of detained motorists to regulate the
reasonableness of police action independent of the checkpoint's
programmatic objectives. Therefore, the police should not be allowed to
accomplish during a checkpoint what they otherwise could not
accomplish without individualized suspicion operating as a regulatory
control mechanism, regardless of whether crime control is the primary or
secondary priority. 61 Only a secondary-purpose inquiry, the argument
continues, can prevent this end-run around both "the general rule of
individualized suspicion,, 62 and the "central concern ... that an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.,
63
The Supreme Court may have suggested this view in Edmond by
dismissing the notion that a lawful secondary purpose can justify a
checkpoint with a primary purpose of crime control.64 The Court
concluded that "law enforcement authorities [thus] would be able to
establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also
included a license or sobriety check., 65  This reasoning may prove
equally applicable when the police switch the "license or sobriety check"
component to their first priority, as the police still would possess the
programmatic power to investigate seized motorists for criminal
wrongdoing without any individualized suspicion. For the detained
motorist, this intrusion does not lessen appreciably from the unlawful
detention in Edmond simply because the programmatic crime control
inquiry to which he or she is subjected has been anointed a "secondary"
objective to some other "primary" agenda. Professor LaFave has noted
that this interpretation of the Supreme Court's footnote in Edmond leaves
allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent.").
61. Cf United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-82 (1975) (rejecting
random border patrol stops, and discussing general requirement of individualized
suspicion under Fourth Amendment to effectuate even "only a brief detention short of
traditional arrest"); Duncan v. United States, 629 A.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. 1993) (evaluating
checkpoint where police testified that checkpoint had the primary purpose of license and
registration check, but officers at scene understood they "were conducting a road block
for drug trafficking in the area").
62. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43.
63. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ; cf In re Muhammed F., 722 N.E.2d
45, 48 (N.Y. 1999) (characterizing Brown's concern for limiting officer discretion as "[a]
critical requirement for all such seizures"); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)
("This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has
discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the
field be circumscribed ... ").
64. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46 ("[T]he Indianapolis program [could not be]
justified by its lawful secondary purpose of keeping impaired motorists off the road and
verifying licenses and registrations.").
65. Id.
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open the question of secondary crime control purposes:
If this is merely an observation that the Court has (quite properly)
only decided the case before it, then one can hardly take objection to
it. If read as a suggestion that the case described in the footnote
might very well mandate a result different than in Edmond, however,
the language deserves to be a matter of considerable concern. Surely
an illegal multi-purpose checkpoint cannot be made legal by the
simple device of assigning "the primary purpose" to one objective
instead of the other, especially since that change is unlikely to be
reflected in any significant change in the magnitude of the intrusion
suffered by the checkpoint detainee. For example, whether the
driver's license check or the drug sniff comes first or is either
claimed or perceived as the primary undertaking is of little moment if
in fact both activities are part of a checkpoint's operation. Indeed,
the footnote appears to reflect that this point is fully appreciated by
the Court ....
A lawful basis to investigate one police interest, therefore, does not
necessarily justify a programmatic, "while we have you" inquiry into
crime control interests, even if that crime control agenda is placed at
number two on the police to-do list.
67
If so, the opening hypothetical checkpoint would seem likely to fail
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Even if the checkpoint was determined to
have a primary purpose of drunk driving interdiction, the police
programmatically devoted resources to a secondary crime-control agenda
by utilizing a drug-sniffing dog and questioning motorists about drugs
and any other contraband. Under the secondary-purpose argument, only
an individualized suspicion requirement can keep the police from
66. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.6(b), at 148 (Supp. 2004); see also id. § 10.8(a), at 212 (Supp. 2004).
But cf Lt. Col. Michael R. Stahlman, New Developments in Search and Seizure: More
than just a Matter of Semantics, 2002 ARMY LAW. 31, 41 (2002).
[T]he Court [in Edmond] avoided deciding whether a checkpoint with a proper
primary purpose to check the sobriety of drivers, for example, will still be
proper if it has a secondary purpose of drug interdiction. Although this portion
of the Court's discussion should not be read as a green light to use sobriety
checkpoints as a subterfuge for drug interdiction, the Court's deliberate
avoidance of this issue seems to suggest that it would be proper to have a valid
sobriety checkpoint that has a secondary or collateral purpose of drug
interdiction.
Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Cf Butler, supra note 15, at 208 ("[A] better way [to prevent law enforcement
from being able to set up a checkpoint for any reason] would have been to eliminate the
use of the word primary altogether and assert that the only purpose for such suspicionless
checkpoints, save for the recognized exclusions, must be one of a legitimate state interest
that is not bent on 'catching the bad guy,' but furthering the safety and welfare of
society.").
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subjecting law-abiding motorists to this type of intrusive criminal inquiry
simply by piggybacking it onto a checkpoint program with a lawful
"primary" purpose.68 Otherwise, a law-abiding motorist can be treated
just like a suspect who raises individualized suspicion so long as the
police simply stop the motorist during a sobriety or license and
registration checkpoint. The Fourth Amendment arguably should not
countenance this sort of form over substance if "[t]he suspicionless
search is the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp
out."
69
No court has embraced this somewhat drastic approach. A more
moderate answer, however, may be drawn from existing models for
evaluating mixed motives outside of the Fourth Amendment context. In
bias crime cases and constitutional and statutory discrimination cases, for
instance, where a defendant's racial animus bias or other discriminatory
purpose must be proved, courts have recognized that "[a] number of
causes may operate concurrently to produce a given result, none
necessarily predominating over the others. 70  Accordingly, courts
typically look for a traditional causal relationship regarding whether the
prohibited motive, even if mixed with other contributory motives, caused
the challenged conduct.71  This causation analysis of mixed motives
68. Cf Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning whether "the
Framers... would have considered 'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops of
individuals not suspected of wrongdoing").
69. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2203 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1377 (Ca. 1995); cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 247(1989) (noting in Title VII employment discrimination context that
"[w]here a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives ... it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was 'the "true
reason"' for the decision" (citation omitted)); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Rarely can it be said that a legislature of
administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely
by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary'
one.").
71. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory
purpose' ... implies that the decisionmaker... selected.., a particular course of action
at least in part 'because of' ... its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (citation
and footnote omitted)); In re M.S., 896 P.2d at 1377 (holding that the accused's
prohibited "bias motivation must be a cause in fact of the offense, whether or not other
causes also exist"); Marc Fleisher, Down the Passage Which We Should not Take: The
Folly of Hate Crime Legislation, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 10-13 (1994) (critically examining
causation analysis of bias in employment discrimination and bias crime statutes); Paul R.
Sheridan, Hate Crime Law in West Virginia, 107 W. VA. L. REv. 699, 706 (2005)
(examining West Virginia bias crime statute and observing that "[o]ther courts, applying
similar criminal statutes, have upheld hate crime convictions even in the face of evidence
that race was not the sole motive. Defendants who act with a racial motive can be found
guilty of a bias crime 'even if they had mixed motives in committing the act' (footnote
omitted)); cf Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66 (holding that the test for
discriminatory purpose is whether "a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor
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reflects the rationale for avoiding "primary" purpose analysis observed
by the Supreme Court when interpreting legislative purpose: "The
search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough without a
requirement that primacy be ascertained. Legislation is frequently
multipurposed: the removal of even a subordinate purpose may shift
altogether the consensus of legislative judgment supporting the statute. 7 a
Human motivation simply is too complex for discrete motives to be
accurately isolated and prioritized as "primary" and "secondary," as
conduct often is produced not by any single objective, but by the full
range of objectives operating together to influence human behavior.73
Thus, these authorities may counsel a burden-shifting approach to
mixed-motive suspicionless checkpoints. Under this approach, a
defendant initially would need to show only that crime control interests a
causative or substantial factor in the programmatic decision to institute a
particular checkpoint. If the defendant meets this burden, the burden
would shift to the prosecution to demonstrate that the police still "would
have taken the same action in the absence of the improper motive., 74 If
in the decision"). See generally LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 45, § 6.4, at 331-52
(reviewing causation principles).
72. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973) (citation omitted); cf Howard v.
Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that "[a] person may act for more
than one reason"); In re M.S., 896 P.2d at 1377 ("A number of causes may operate
concurrently to produce a given result, none necessarily predominating over the others.").
73. For an excellent overview of the law of "mixed motives" in different legal
contexts, see Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MARYLAND L. REv. (forthcoming 2006-2007),
available at http://ssm.com/ abstract=912594 (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
74. Howard, 986 F.2d at 26; see also Arlington Heights 429 U.S. at 271 n.21
("Proof that the decision... was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose
would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof
would, however, have shifted.., the burden of establishing that the same decision would
have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."); Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-47.
Analysis of mixed-motive peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), has generated less clarity, although the Supreme Court has not spoken
definitely on the applicable analysis in this context. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 ("The
Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race." (emphasis added)); cf Howard, 986 F.2d at 30 (applying Supreme
Court's approach to mixed motives in Arlington Heights and Price Waterhouse, and thus
concluding "that Batson challenges may be brought by defendants who can show that
racial discrimination was a substantial part of the of the motivation for a prosecutor's
peremptory challenges, leaving to the prosecutor the affirmative defense of showing that
the same challenges would have been exercised for race-neutral reasons in the absence of
such partially improper motivation"); William M. Carter, A Thirteenth Amendment
Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 17, 36-44
(2004) (criticizing use of "sole motive" standard by lower courts that evaluated racial
profiling claims under Equal Protection Clause). See generally Kesser v. Cambra, 392
F.3d 327, 336-38 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing development of, and dissent from, mixed-
motive analysis in Batson context); Covey, supra note 73 (arguing against mixed-motive
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the prosecution cannot meet its burden, the checkpoint violates Edmond.
Importantly, this burden-shifting analysis analytically does not conflict
with Edmond's primary purpose test. On the contrary, it advances the
test. By placing the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate that a
crime control objective motivating a checkpoint did not control the
decision to establish the checkpoint, a court ensures that any
checkpoint's non-crime control purposes were primary and not simply
concurrent or mixed with crime control objectives.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Illinois v. Lidster75 and
Illinois v. Caballes76 do not clash with this approach to crime control
purposes at suspicionless checkpoints. Lidster simply does not address
the question. The police in Lidster arrested Lidster for drunk driving at
an "information seeking" checkpoint established in response to a recent
fatal hit-and-run accident at the location." Lidster, however, never
argued that the checkpoint pursued a secondary programmatic crime-
control agenda that focused on stopped motorists; Lidster claimed that
the acknowledged principal goal of investigating the past hit-and-run
accident amounted to crime control. The criminal inquiry of Lidster
began only because his erratic driving in response to this single-
objective, non-crime control checkpoint generated individualized
suspicion.78 So, Lidster offers no guidance on the question left open in
Edmond of "whether the State may establish a checkpoint program with
the [lawful] primary purpose... and a secondary purpose of interdicting
narcotics.
79
Illinois v. Caballess8 by contrast, comes closer to touching on the
question of secondary purpose. Caballes lawfully was stopped for
speeding by an Illinois State Trooper.81 While Caballes waited in the
trooper's car for his warning ticket to be written, another trooper arrived
on the scene with a drug sniffing canine and had the dog inspect
Caballes' car.82 When the dog signaled at Caballes' trunk, a search of
the trunk uncovered a large amount of marijuana, and Caballes was
arrested.83 The whole incident took less than ten minutes.84
analysis in Batson context); Holly E. Engelmann, Note, Guzman v. State, 56 SMU L.
REv. 2117, 2122-23 (2003) (reviewing critics of mixed-motives analysis in the Batson
context).
75. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
76. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
77. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422-23.
78. See id. at 422.
79. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2.
80. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
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The trial court denied Caballes' motion to suppress the evidence,
reasoning that the troopers did not unnecessarily prolong the stop by
employing the drug sniffing dog, as Caballes was still waiting for his
warning ticket to be written.85 The intermediate appellate court affirmed
the trial court's decision, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The
Illinois Supreme Court found a lack of "specific and articulable facts"
that led the troopers to believe that drug evidence was present,8 6 and the
use of the drug sniffing dog converted the encounter from a traffic stop
to a drug investigation unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
87
The United States Supreme Court rejected the Illinois Supreme
Court's premise that the external dog sniff of Caballes' vehicle itself
extended the nature of the police intrusion beyond the intrusion of the
traffic stop itself. As the Court explained, "the use of a well-trained
narcotics-detection dog.., during a lawful traffic stop, generally does
not implicate legitimate privacy interests ... [because] [a] dog sniff...
reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess....,,88
The police in Caballes quite clearly used the drug-sniffing dog to
advance a crime-control objective of narcotics detection in addition to
their "primary" objective of traffic enforcement. At first blush,
therefore, Caballes seems to resolve the secondary-purpose question,
since the Court's affirmation of this practice suggests that it embraces
secondary crime control agendas.
Caballes, however, was detained during a traffic stop, not at a
suspicionless checkpoint. The motives of the individual officers who
detained Caballes and employed the drug-sniffing dog thus were
irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. 89  Instead, the Fourth
Amendment queried only whether the police had individualized cause to
stop Caballes for speeding, an objective basis for police action that itself
regulated the reasonableness of the police intrusion into Caballes'
privacy interests. 90 By contrast, at a checkpoint, the police stop motorists
85. See id. at 407.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 408; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. 2003),
vacated, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
88. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
89. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary... Fourth Amendment analysis.").
90. Cf id. at 817-18 ("[Probable cause] afford[s] the 'quantum of individualized
suspicion' necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently constrained."). In
Whren, the Supreme Court held that "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred." Id. at 810. Nevertheless, the general view appears to be that "[a]
traffic stop is permissible if the officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred." United States v. Harcum, 184 F. App'x
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without any individualized cause operating to regulate the reasonableness
of their actions-regardless of whether those actions relate to the
checkpoint's "primary" purpose or some other crime control objective.
Without some secondary-purpose analysis to regulate police action at
checkpoints, therefore, the police can transform the suspicionless seizure
of any motorist into a traditional narcotics investigation. 91  Indeed,
Edmond otherwise would seem to undermine the logic of the Supreme
Court's deference to individualized suspicion over police motives when
such suspicion does exists.
In the lower courts that have considered the question thus far,
however, the secondary-purpose argument does not appear to have
carried the day. These courts have rejected the argument that a
secondary crime control objective invalidates a checkpoint that has a
lawful primary purpose,92 and none has addressed the applicability of the
burden-shifting, mixed-motive analysis applicable in discrimination
317, 318 (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished decision). Since either way the police typically
observe the alleged traffic infraction personally, in practice the distinction may seem one
of form over substance. But, according to the Seventh Circuit, the distinction is
significant, as the Seventh Circuit refuses to treat traffic stops based on probable cause as
an investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). On the contrary,
"such stops are arrests," United States v. Wilkie, 182 F. App'x 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished decision), and thus the investigatory limitations applicable to Terry stops,
see, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985), do not restrict probable
cause-based traffic stops. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.
2002) (en banc) ("Treating [traffic] arrests on probable cause as if they.., were Terry
stops gives the officers too little discretion," and thus, for example, "arrested persons
(unlike those stopped at checkpoints, or on reasonable suspicion) need not be released as
quickly as possible."); Wilkie, 182 F. App'x at 536 (rejecting application of Terry
principles in determining reasonableness of officer's actions during traffic stop). But see
United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (noting
Seventh Circuit approach, but noting that its precedent, "following the Supreme Court,
has treated routine traffic stops, whether justified by probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of a violation, as Terry stops"); United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230
(10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("We ... reject the government's position and adhere to our
settled rule that a traffic stop should be analyzed under Terry, regardless of whether the
stop is based on probable cause or some lesser suspicion .... [Because such traffic stops
rarely lead to arrests even when authorized by statute,] a typical traffic stop resembles in
character the investigative stop governed by Terry more closely than it does a custodial
arrest.").
91. Cf Childs, 277 F.3d at 952 (discussing distinction between stops at suspicionless
checkpoints and stops based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and concluding
that when courts evaluate the nature and duration of police questioning of motorists,
"[t]reating checkpoint stops as if they were Terry stops supported by reasonable suspicion
gives the officers too much discretion over drivers who arrive at roadblocks or security
screening points").
92. See, e.g., United States v. Chacon, 330 F.3d 323, 328 n.3 (5th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Davis, 270
F.3d 977, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1312
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
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contexts. United States v. Davis93 effectively illustrates the prevailing
rationale. In analyzing whether a checkpoint pursued crime control as its
primary objective, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that a secondary objective of crime control would not upset
the constitutionality of the checkpoint under Edmond.94  The court
explained that footnote two in Edmond leaves this question open, yet:
The footnote seems divorced from the rest of the opinion.
Throughout the text the Court states again and again that when the
"primary purpose" of a roadblock is general crime control it is
unconstitutional. This more than suggests that if the "primary
purpose" had been for a purpose the Court already had endorsed ...
the roadblock would be constitutional.
95
The court reasoned further:
[I]t is hard to explain why the Court framed the inquiry in terms of
[the City of Indianapolis'] "primary" purpose, unless the Court
believed that it would be constitutional for a State to "establish a
checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking licenses or
driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics."
96
Instead, when faced with a multi-purpose checkpoint, these courts
have taken Edmond at face value and endeavored to isolate and weigh
and the checkpoint's different programmatic objectives to determine its
"primary" purpose. These decisions not only have yielded helpful
doctrinal insight into this process, but also illustrate that Edmond's
programmatic purpose inquiry, when applied properly, restricts police
discretion to transform suspicionless checkpoints into routine criminal
inquiries.
B. Secondary Purposes: How Are They Distinct From Primary
Purpose?
Edmond makes clear that a checkpoint's purposes must be identified
and evaluated solely at the programmatic level, not through the motives
of individual officers acting at the scene.97 This programmatic analysis
93. 270 F.3d 977 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
94. See id. at 979-80.
95. Id. at 979 (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 979-80 (quoting United States v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 n.2 (2000); see
also Davis, 270 F.3d at 980 (describing McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1312, as rejecting "the
proposition that a roadblock must have as its sole purpose the checking of licenses and
registrations").
97. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (emphasizing that the
Edmond programmatic purpose inquiry "has nothing to do with discerning what is in the
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of police purpose both broadens and narrows Edmond's "purpose"
inquiry. It broadens the inquiry because it necessitates broad and critical
examination of the institutional police interests prompting the particular
checkpoint, such as citizen complaints, arrest patterns and neighborhood
profiles, as well as the precise programmatic directives flowing down to
98officers at the scene about how to allocate the checkpoint's resources.
This expansive inquiry into why the police instituted a particular
checkpoint adds a full evidentiary layer onto traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis, which otherwise focuses solely on the objective
character of police action.99
A programmatic analysis also narrows the inquiry because, as
Edmond makes quite clear, a programmatic analysis precludes courts
from inquiring into the ever-shifting priorities of individual officers who
may elevate crime control as a priority over the checkpoint's
programmatic objectives. So long as officers adhere to the checkpoint's
programmatic directives in their actions, only the objectives of that
general program will be scrutinized, and variations in individual officers'
motives are excluded from the evidentiary "purpose" mix.
100
This purely programmatic purpose inquiry may help to sharpen
judicial focus and eliminate some of the uncertainty and subjectivity
often associated with purpose or motive inquiries. Any after-the-fact
inquiry into intent or motive presents uncertainty and the potential for an
erroneous subjective appraisal by the evaluator. This uncertainty only
escalates when courts are asked to isolate mixed motives for challenged
conduct.10 1 Police objectives and priorities, moreover, can vary from
hour to hour and corner to corner, let alone month to month and city to
city, making accurate judicial assessment of individualized police officer
motives difficult at best. 10 2 A programmatic analysis, however, avoids
the vagaries of individual police officer agendas. And, because
suspicionless checkpoints must be executed pursuant to clear
mind of the individual officer conducting the search").
98. See, e.g., Davis, 270 F.3d at 979-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (examining full range of
police interests leading to establishment of checkpoint program).
99. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 813, 813 (1996) ("[Slubjective intentions
play no role in ordinary... Fourth Amendment analysis.").
100. See Brigham City, 126 S. Ct. at 1948 (emphasizing that the Edmond
programmatic purpose inquiry "has nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of
the individual officer conducting the search"); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38 (holding that the
programmatic purpose inquiry "is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual
officers acting at the scene"). Racially discriminatory motives, however, may warrant an
individualized purpose inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause. See supra note 39
(detailing authorities supporting equal protection exclusionary rule).
101. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
102. Cf Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 ("[Pjolice enforcement practices, even if they could
be practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and from time to time.").
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guidelines,10 3 checkpoints often will generate a programmatic paper trail
by which courts more objectively can assess what the police intended to
accomplish through a particular checkpoint, as well as the weight, if any,
that the police assigned to different objectives.
10 4
1. Mixed-bag Checkpoints and Resource Allocation
Some courts have expressed concern when presented with
checkpoints that fail to provide such an objective programmatic paper
trial, where the police instead cite to a poorly prioritized or
undocumented mixed-bag of police objectives. These decisions illustrate
the complexity of objectively identifying which of many programmatic
checkpoint purposes constitutes a truly "primary" objective distinct from
any subsidiary police priorities. And, they suggest that the Fourth
Amendment accordingly does not require courts in this context "to
plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement."' 0 5 Rather, the
prosecution affirmatively must demonstrate that a suspicionless vehicle
checkpoint primarily was designed to advance a non-crime control
purpose.
In People v. Jackson,'0 6 for example, the police established a
checkpoint in uptown Manhattan. 10 7  The defendant's vehicle was
stopped at the checkpoint, and while one officer questioned the
defendant, another officer observed a package of cocaine when he
directed his flashlight into the vehicle. 10 8 At the suppression hearing,
two officers testified.'0 9 The arresting officer testified that the roadblock
was established to combat a recent increase in crime in the precinct,
including robberies and carjackings of taxi and livery cab drivers."
0
This officer also testified "that there were additional safety objectives,
103. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("[A checkpoint] seizure must be
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers."); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (requiring a
"substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion").
104. Cf, e.g., United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 978, 981 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(evaluating checkpoint based on the Police Department's "Summer Mobile Force
initiative"); Commonwealth v. Buchannon, 122 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Ky. 2003) (expressing
concern over absence of "established official guidelines governing vehicle checkpoints").
But cf People v. Sinzheimer, 790 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that the
lower "court properly rejected defendant's contention that the checkpoint was illegal
because the People failed to provide written guidelines concerning the operation of the
checkpoint").
105. Wren, 517 U.S. at 815.
106. 782 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 2002).
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including substantiating currently valid safety inspections, licenses and
registrations.""' The senior officer who initiated the checkpoint testified
that he arranged for the checkpoint after receiving reports from
headquarters "'that [the] area.., was [being] subjected to a large amount
of violent crime."'" 12  He testified further that the checkpoint was
designed to "'educate cab drivers' concerning the increase in robberies
and shootings, 'to suppress crime' and to interdict '[d]rugs and guns.""
1 3
Both officers testified "that the procedure was in operation for only about
an hour and a half, and was dismantled approximately five minutes after
defendant's arrest. .. 14
In rejecting this checkpoint, the New York Court of Appeals
interpreted Edmond "essentially as a refinement of the grave public
interest/concern prong of the Brown v. Texas balancing process."' 15 As a
result, "no matter how well a checkpoint program employed safeguards
to prevent abusive police practices, the ends of general crime control
ordinarily cannot justify vehicle stops on less than individualized
suspicion."' 1 6  The court noted that the Supreme Court "did not
undertake comprehensively to delineate the kinds of particularized
governmental interests for which suspicionless stops could be
utilized."' 7  But, under Edmond, "the People have the burden of
establishing that the primary programmatic objective ... for initiating a
suspicionless vehicle stop procedure was not merely to further general
crime control."' 18  The court concluded that the prosecution failed to
meet this burden:
The suppression hearing testimony of the officers who set up and
manned the roadblock where defendant's vehicle was stopped
pointed to a series of unprioritized purposes .... It is self-evident
that many of these objectives were related only to general crime
control. Never did the officers unequivocally point to a primary
programmatic objective that would qualify under [Edmond], such as
addressing some "type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and
limb."119
The officers, however, did testify to programmatic objectives that would
satisfy Edmond if primary, and "the prosecution argued that at least one
111. People v. Jackson, 782 N.E.2d 67, 68 (N.Y. 2002).
112. Id. at 68 (third alteration in original).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 70.
116. Id. at 71.
117. People v. Jackson, 782 N.E.2d 67, 71 (N.Y. 2002).
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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was primary., 120 Consequently, the court's rejection of the checkpoint
indicates its view that Edmond requires the prosecution objectively to
demonstrate, and not just articulate, a checkpoint's actual primary
programmatic purpose. 
12 1
Of course, the police in Jackson arguably did not appear to attempt
to prioritize one objective over others, and their quick dismantling of the
checkpoint after the defendant's arrest may have revealed their true
primary objective as crime control. Therefore, even though one or both
of the officers may have testified to a lawful primary purpose supporting
the checkpoint, the court may have viewed any potentially lawful
primary purpose as a pretext for investigating drivers for criminal
activity. Yet, the prosecution did argue prevention of taxi and livery
carjackings and robberies as the checkpoint's lawful primary purpose.
122
Nevertheless, the court saw no need to decide whether such a primary
purpose would satisfy Edmond, holding simply, "this is not the occasion
to decide whether, had that been the primary objective, it would meet the
requirements of City of Indianapolis."'123 This refusal by the court to
consider the prosecution's asserted-and on its face arguably lawful
124 -
primary purpose suggests that the court grounded its rejection of this
checkpoint not in some implied pretext finding, but rather, in the
prosecution's failure to detangle the poorly prioritized mixed-bag of
programmatic objectives that the checkpoint pursued. Jackson,
therefore, may signal that a checkpoint without demonstrably prioritized
purposes should fail to satisfy Edmond because the prosecution cannot
objectively isolate its true primary programmatic purpose.
1 5
Indeed, if the police pursue multiple objectives at a checkpoint, but
120. Id. at 72 n.2.
121. Cf State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 512-13 (Tenn. 2006) (rejecting entry
checkpoint to public housing complex that the police testified was intended to enforce
no-trespassing policy at the complex, but also to prevent crimes associated with
trespassers).
122. Jackson, 782 N.E.2d at 72 n.2.
123. Id.
124. Cf MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (upholding New York Police Department's program of random
passenger bag searches in subway system, which was defended under the special needs
doctrine as furthering the City's interest in deterring acts of terrorism in the subway
system). But cf Hayes, 188 S.W.3d at 512-13 (rejecting entry checkpoint to public
housing complex that the police testified was intended to enforce no-trespassing policy at
the complex, but also to "prevent" crimes associated with trespassers).
125. See Jackson, 782 N.E.2d at 71 ("Never did the officers unequivocally point to a
primary programmatic objective that would qualify under City of Indianapolis .. "
(emphasis added)); cf Commonwealth v. Buchannon, 122 S.W.3d 565, 569-571 (Ky.
2003) (rejecting "DUI-DRUG" checkpoint that inspected for drunk driving but also
included a drug sniffing dog, where the police cited to a primary purpose of detecting
"any violation of the law").
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fail programmatically to assign a majority of their resources to a lawful
purpose instead of a crime control objective, can the lawful purpose
prove objectively "primary?" The very nature of checkpoints suggests
not. Edmond limits the purpose inquiry to a programmatic analysis
because the Fourth Amendment requires that checkpoints be designed in
a programmatic fashion, 126 "pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers."' 127  Thus,
checkpoints by their nature presuppose that individual officers will be
constrained in their actions and discretion by the checkpoint's
programmatic game plan, making only the programmatic purposes of the
checkpoint relevant. If, however, a checkpoint's design leaves discretion
to the police about how to prioritize the checkpoint's different
programmatic agendas, the checkpoint objectively fails at the
programmatic level to prioritize those different agendas. More to the
point, if the checkpoint allows individual officers subjectively to decide
which agenda to prioritize, the checkpoint program fails to inform the
executing officers about the weight to assign to the checkpoint's various
objectives. This checkpoint framework consequently fails the exact type
of programmatic analysis that Edmond requires, for its resources have
not been programmatically allocated to prioritize a lawful objective over
all others.
Resource allocation effectively can reveal whether a checkpoint
program objectively has prioritized its purposes, or improperly has left
much of that discretion to individual executing officers. For example, in
United States v. Faulkner,128 a Ranger at a federal park arrested Faulkner
for possession of an open container of alcohol and driving with a
suspended license when Faulkner was stopped at an entry checkpoint to
the park.129 The entry checkpoint was instituted largely in response to
complaints about intoxicated motorists, increased litter, illegal fires,
underage alcohol consumption and drug use, and gang activity. 3 ' At the
checkpoint the Ranger sometimes would ask motorists whether they
possessed alcohol and seek consent to search containers, but every
vehicle would receive a Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") litter bag
that had the rules and regulations printed on them.131 The BLM spent
$2,500 to purchase 5,000 litter bags for this checkpoint. 132 Although the
126. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45-46 (2000)
("[P]rogrammatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment
intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.").
127. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
128. 450 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2006).
129. See id. 469-70.
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checkpoint pursued the likely lawful police objectives of litter control
and park safety, Faulkner contended that the checkpoint program itself
indicated a primary interest relating to crime control by focusing on
illegal alcohol and drug interdiction and gang activity."' The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, focusing on the resources the checkpoint program
itself directed at non-crime control purposes as objective proof of the
primacy of those purposes. The Court noted:
The litter bag itself is clear evidence that the primary purpose of the
[checkpoint] was not to advance the general interest in crime control.
The preprinted rules on the litter bag, which include regulations
concerning campfires for fire safety, refuse disposal for litter control,
and camping restrictions in a day use recreation area, are further
evidence of a premeditated regulato 7 purpose other than advancing
the general interest in crime control.1
4
Faulkner's focus on resource allocation demonstrates a concern, as
in Jackson, with objective proof that a checkpoint programmatically has
prioritized its purposes and not left that decision with the executing
officers.'35 This concern goes beyond the question of whether the
checkpoint's non-crime control objectives really are just a pretext for
crime control. Resource allocation consistent with a primary non-crime
control purpose confirms that the checkpoint program signaled the
principal objective of the checkpoint to executing officers, assuring that
these officers would not have the discretion to supplant their own
objectives with those of the checkpoint program-precisely the point of
Edmond's program-only analysis of checkpoint purpose.
Focus solely on resource allocation, however, would oversimplify
the inquiry. The police easily can design and execute a checkpoint so
that it principally targets non-crime control interests-such as drunk
driving or other vehicular safety concerns-and still has the primary
programmatic objective of giving the police the opportunity to
133. Seeid.at471.
134. Id. at 470; see also id. at 471 ("Considering the BLM's purchase of 5,000 litter
bags with park regulations printed on each bag, the district court could certainly conclude
that the primary purpose of the [checkpoint] was 'to provide information to visitors to the
recreation area of the regulations governing its use ... ' (ellipse in original); cf People
v. Codrington, 818 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (upholding bag-search
checkpoint at entry to Central Park parade, finding that "the primary goal.., was to
prevent alcoholic beverages from being brought into brought into the park in light of the
drunkenness, accompanied by alcohol-related violence and other misconduct, that
occurred in the park during past parades").
135. Cf. United States v. Rone, No. 1:05CR-I l-M, 2006 WL 1687780, at *3 (W.D.
Ky. June 19, 2006) (emphasizing DUI certification of officers assigned to sobriety and
road safety checkpoint); Commonwealth v. Buchannon, 122 S.W.3d 565, 569, 570 (Ky.
2003) (emphasizing that only one of several checkpoint officers had DUI training).
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investigate motorists for criminality without individualized suspicion.
Although this focus includes traditional pretextual checkpoints where the
asserted non-crime control purpose is a sham to cover for suspicionless
crime control, this inquiry becomes most apt, and complex, when a
checkpoint's purported non-crime control primary purpose shares a
factual relationship to, and dependency upon, facts relating to
criminality.
2. Primary Purposes and Police Objectives
The Supreme Court in Edmond offered no ready methodology for
identifying the "primary" purpose of a checkpoint that pursues multiple
objectives, including crime control, even when the checkpoint's priorities
are documented in a programmatic paper trail. Lower courts, however,
have begun to explore this process-and not without difficulty. United
States v. Davis'36 offers one of the richer analyses of a checkpoint birthed
of multiple potential objectives.
In Davis, the police stopped the defendant at a roadblock and
arrested him for traffic violations. 137 A search of his vehicle revealed
evidence of drug dealing, for which the defendant was indicted and
convicted. 138 The roadblock in Davis "had been set up as part of the
Metropolitan Police Department's 'Summer Mobile Force."",139  An
officer testified that the police established the roadblock after receiving
complaints from local community and church groups about roadway
safety dealing largely with children. 140 The officer further testified that
"[a]fter obtaining this information, and information about 'drugs, gun
violence, robberies, [and] assaults,' the officer chose the neighborhood
for a 'safety compliance check, ,,141 with the objective of assuring many
forms of vehicle compliance with safety regulations. 42 The officer who
testified briefed the officers at the scene on these safety concerns, and
"gave no instructions 'about looking for narcotics or firearms,' and he
was not aware that any of the officers at the scene were instructed about
matters 'unrelated to vehicle safety."1
43
The Court of Appeals nevertheless found that "this evidence... is
not sufficient under the Supreme Court's... decision in Edmond"'
144
136. 270 F.3d 977 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
137. See id. at 978.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 981.
141. Id. (alteration in original).
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because "the district court made no findings about the Summer Mobile
Force." 145 The court noted:
According to a police manual, the Summer Mobile Force initiative
had as its overall objective "to restore the public's confidence in the
Metropolitan Police Department through the reduction and
prevention of crime and violence by utilizing short-term, pro-active,
high visibility enforcement techniques.".. . Among the tactical
approaches mentioned is a "highly trained and supervised approach
to proactive traffic enforcement," using among other things
roadblocks.... "Remove the automobile as the conveyance of
choice by narcotics traffickers and individuals secreting guns and
stolen property in the District of Columbia."
' 146
The court thus concluded that "[s]ince the district court ... does not
appear to have taken these 'programmatic purposes' into account, we
must send the case back for further proceedings in light of
Edmond. .. 4 7
By remanding the case for further findings about the "Summer
Mobile Force" program's actual objectives, the Davis court endorsed
both significant extensions to and limitations upon Edmond's inquiry
into primary versus secondary purposes. Davis extends Edmond's
inquiry by expanding the programmatic levels of abstraction at which
courts must assess a checkpoint's primary purpose. At the design level,
the police in Davis responded primarily, if not exclusively, to local
vehicular safety concerns in instituting the checkpoint. This primary
purpose would appear to comport with Edmond. Yet, at the policy level
behind the "Summer Mobile Force" program, the police may have
exploited local vehicular safety concerns to advance their own crime
control objectives through the checkpoint. As the court noted, "[t]he
objectives of the citizens are not necessarily the objectives of the
police."' 148 Thus, "[a]lthough we know that citizens in the neighborhood
complained about speeding, it is not entirely clear whether the only
purpose of the police in establishing the checkpoint was to deal with that
problem."' 149 Davis accordingly indicates that courts must broaden their
inquiry to expose all police motives underlying a checkpoint accurately
to determine its true primary purpose.
150
145. Id.
146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. Id.
148. United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
149. Id.
150. Cf, e.g., United States v. Rone, No. 1:05CR-11-M, 2006 WL 1687780, at *3
(W.D. Ky. June 19, 2006) (in reviewing challenged primary purpose of sobriety and road
safety checkpoint, the court examined police communication logs for 100 inspections and
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Yet, Davis also limits Edmond's inquiry by eschewing an
oversimplified cause-and-effect analysis in determining a checkpoint's
primary purpose. In searching for the primary purpose to the Davis
checkpoint, the court cautioned that, while "it would be impossible to
discern the purpose of a particular roadblock without determining the
reasons behind it ... [o]ne must be careful not to fall into the trap of
thinking that any 'but for' cause of a roadblock represents its primary
purpose within Edmond's meaning.""'
Davis thus exposes a corollary problem to the mixed-motive
problem present in Jackson: if crime control interests prompt the police
to establish a particular checkpoint, but the checkpoint is designed to
address non-crime control concerns like local vehicular safety problems,
and it is executed to advance that latter agenda, which objective is
"primary" for purposes of Edmond? For example, assume that the police
reserve or prioritize checkpoint resources to high-crime neighborhoods
when the police receive vehicular safety reports or complaints from those
neighborhoods. The resource allocations associated with these
checkpoints may point to a non-crime control primary purpose. But,
vehicular safety may operate as a catalyst for targeting more highly
prized crime control objectives. Add that the particular neighborhood's
vehicular safety concerns depend upon local criminal activity, such as
locales with high vehicle-bound prostitution or drug-dealing activity,
which may draw unsafe numbers of pedestrians, stopped and speeding
vehicles, and intoxicated drivers.
Edmond does not guide courts on how to parse through these
motives to determine which one controls the checkpoints as its "primary"
purpose. Davis, however, hints that a factual cause-and-effect
relationship between crime control concerns and a lawful primary
resulting citations, and previous arrest numbers at checkpoint). In McCreary County, Ky.
v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), where the Supreme Court searched for the
primary purpose behind a Ten Commandments display, the Court rejected the narrow
inquiry proposed by the Counties that arranged the display and emphasized the breadth of
inquiry required accurately to assess governmental purpose:
[The Counties] argue that purpose in a case like this one should be inferred, if
at all, only from the latest news about the last in a series of governmental
actions, however close they may all be in time and subject. But the world is not
made brand new every morning, and the Counties are simply asking us to
ignore perfectly probative evidence; they want an absentminded objective
observer, not one presumed top be familiar with the history of the
government's actions and competent to learn what history has to show.... The
Counties' position just bucks common sense: reasonable observers have
reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid an observer "to turn a
blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose."
Id. at 2736-37 (third alteration in original).
151. Davis. 270 F.3d at 982.
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purpose, such as in the latter example, likely comports with Edmond. By
contrast, the police in Davis, for example, likely violated Edmond if the
checkpoint would not have been established but-for the grander crime
control objective of "restor[ing] the public's confidence in the
Metropolitan Police Department through reduction and prevention of
crime and violence by utilizing short-term, pro-active, high visibility
enforcement techniques."'
' 52
To illustrate, the Davis court emphasized its previous decigion in
McFayden v. United States.'53 In McFayden, the police established a
checkpoint under "Operation Cleansweep," a program "designed to
attack the problem of drug dealing in D.C."' 154 The police placed
roadblocks in accordance with community complaints about "traffic and
narcotics problems. 155  The roadblock thus reflected that "'traffic
congestion is one serious problem that results from street drug sales in
the District of Columbia.' Buyers stop illegally, double-park, make U-
turns, speed and disrupt the flow of traffic in the neighborhood."'' 56 In
revisiting the McFayden checkpoint, the Davis court explained:
The roadblock in McFayden had a principal purpose of controlling
the traffic problems associated with drug dealing and "[w]hatever
advantage was gained in drug enforcement was coincidental to the
principal purpose of the traffic roadblocks." While the McFayden
court cautioned that it might not sustain a roadblock if it were a
"subterfuge," "purportedly established to check licenses" but "located
and conducted in such a way as to indicate that its principal purpose
was the detection of crime unrelated to licensing," it rejected the
proposition that a roadblock must have as its sole purpose the
checking of licenses and registrations.
157
In Davis, by contrast, the record did not make clear "whether... open air
drug dealing was causing the traffic problems in this neighborhood,"'
5 8
requiring a remand. 59 The court concluded, however, with "[s]everal
words of caution":160
Whenever something is done for several reasons, it might not have
been done in the absence of any one of those reasons. If there had
not been drug dealing in the neighborhood, the McFayden roadblock
152. Id. at 981.
153. 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
154. Id. at 1308.
155. Id.
156. Davis, 270 F.3d at 980 (quoting McFayden, 865 F.2d at 1308, 1312).
157. Davis, 270 F.3d at 980 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 982.
159. Id. at 983.
160. Id. at 982.
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would not have been placed there, yet its primary purpose dealt with
vehicular safety. The assumption underlying the search for the
"primary purpose" is that several purposes might have moved the
police to set up a particular roadblock. This is why finding the
primary or predominant purpose will often prove difficult, as the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Edmond.161
Davis does not exactly set a precise roadmap for evaluating why the
police Oestablished a specific checkpoint. But, it highlights that many
layers of motives may underlie any checkpoint and courts must explore
all of them before assessing the checkpoint's principal objective. As in
McFayden, the fact that the police would not have created a checkpoint
but for its relationship to crime-related concerns does not mean that
crime control primarily motivated the checkpoint if the crime-related
concerns simply caused the vehicular-safety or other legitimate
checkpoint objectives. 162  If, however, the police have targeted local
vehicular safety concerns through a checkpoint only to further a grander
crime control objective, as may have been the case in Davis,'63 crime
control may supersede vehicular safety as the checkpoint's primary
objective, even though at a design and execution level the checkpoint
primarily advances a lawful objective, 164 and even though the police may
161. Id.
162. Cf, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466, 471 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
argument by motorist who was arrested at checkpoint for possession of open alcoholic
container that park entry checkpoint primarily pursued crime control because the
checkpoint partially was motivated by complaints about criminal activity in the park
including alcohol consumption; facts objectively established that checkpoint was
designed principally to inform entrants of park rules, including rules regarding alcohol
consumption on park grounds).
163. As of November 14, 2006, a Shepard's inquiry did not reveal any subsequent
action in Davis on remand.
164. See People v. Trotter, 810 N.Y.S.2d 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). The police in
Trotter established a checkpoint as part of a broader "Rochester Initiative," where a
tactical unit comprised of several law enforcement departments targeted violent crimes
and drug trafficking in a specific Rochester area known as "crescent." See id. at 611.
The police, however, designed and executed the checkpoint solely to inspect for
windshield stickers, driver's licenses and registration. See id. Indeed, on the date when
the defendant was stopped at the checkpoint and arrested for narcotics possession, "37
traffic tickets were issued." Id. at 613. In evaluating this checkpoint's primary purpose
under Edmond, the court framed the question as "whether the 'primary purpose' of the
checkpoint is to be determined by the underlying reason for taking it, or by the particular
manner in which the checkpoint was conducted." Id. The prosecution argued the latter
understanding of Edmond, but the court embraced the former:
Standing alone, such a checkpoint would be a permissible routine highway
safety-related stop under Edmond and Prouse. The checkpoint was not,
however, conducted in isolation. Rather, the record establishes that the
checkpoint was an inseparable part of the Rochester initiative, the purpose of
which was to detect and deter violent crime and drug trafficking.
Id. at 614.
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brand the checkpoint as non-crime control in its primary purpose.
165
The United States Supreme Court has not explored a checkpoint
with these types of layered purposes. In Illinois v. Lidster,'66 however,
the Supreme Court may have indicated receptiveness to the type of
analysis highlighted by Davis and McFayden. In Lidster, the police
established a checkpoint at the time and place of a fatal hit-and-run
accident a week earlier, with the hope that nearby industrial complex
workers leaving work might have seen something.167  During the
checkpoint, officers stopped vehicles for ten to fifteen seconds, asked
whether any of the occupants knew anything about the accident, and
distributed a flyer seeking information about the accident. 168  Lidster
approached the checkpoint in his van and swerved, nearly hitting an
officer. 169 The officer smelled alcohol on Lidster's breath, and another
officer administered a sobriety test and arrested Lidster for driving under
the influence of alcohol, for which he was convicted. 1
70
The trial court rejected Lidster's motion to suppress, challenging the
checkpoint as unlawful, but the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
checkpoint violated Edmond because it had a primary programmatic
purpose of crime control."" The United States Supreme Court disagreed,
however, finding that the "stop's primary law enforcement purpose was
not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime,
but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in
providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by
others." 172 The Supreme Court's divergence of opinion thus illustrates
the cause-and-effect type of analysis that Davis and McFayden highlight.
The Illinois Supreme Court essentially reasoned that, but for the law
enforcement's desire to investigate and solve a past crime, the police
would not have instituted the checkpoint. 173 Accordingly, the Illinois
165. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 788 So. 2d 1064, 1065-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding driver's license inspection checkpoint that formed part of Tampa's "Operation
Safe Streets" had primary purpose of crime control, notwithstanding that "[w]hen asked
if the purpose of the checkpoint was to target illegal drug activity, [the testifying police
officer] responded, 'No, it was to target people without licenses. If you get drugs that's
fine too, but basically it's a driver's license checkpoint"').
166. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
167. Id. at 422, 427.
168. Id. at 422.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 859-62 (Ill. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 419
(2004).
172. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.
173. See Lidster, 779 N.E.2d at 859-60 ("[T]he [F]ourth [A]mendment's prohibition
against suspicionless seizures should not give way to the normal needs of law
enforcement, be they identified as crime control, criminal investigation or canvassing
efforts to obtain information leading to the identification and apprehension of the
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Court held that the checkpoint had a primary programmatic purpose of
crime control and, thus, was unconstitutional.17 4 By contrast, the United
States Supreme Court approached the checkpoint's "primary" purpose
using a similar analysis to what Davis advocated. 75 The Court reasoned
that the checkpoint was not designed to target the stopped drivers for
criminal inquiry, 176 but rather to seek their aid as "'responsible citizens'
and possible witnesses. 177  This police objective would not have
materialized but for the past crime and the police interest in solving it, of
course, but a criminal inquiry was not the principal objective of the
checkpoint: 178 seeking assistance from the public was.179 This reasoning
parallels the Davis court's observations about McFayden: "Whenever
something is done for several reasons, it might not have been done in the
absence of any one of those reasons. If there had not been drug dealing
in the neighborhood, the McFayden roadblock would not have been
placed there, yet its primary purpose dealt with vehicular safety."' 80
Consequently, the police observation of Lidster driving drunk can be
viewed as merely a "spin-off''18' benefit from a proper checkpoint. 1
82
This process of objectively isolating a checkpoint's true primary
purpose can become a rather complex exercise, as cases like Jackson,
Davis and McFayden illustrate. 183  The exercise nonetheless remains
crucial if Edmond's primary purpose test should have any real teeth,
particularly if courts remain unreceptive to the argument that a crime
control objective should either invalidate a checkpoint or shift the burden
to the prosecution to demonstrate a distinct controlling purpose.
perpetrator of a crime.").
174. See id. at 860-61 ("In investigating and solving any crime, police efforts are
directed at general crime control. This holds true whether the police happen upon the
perpetrator of the crime at the roadblock or obtain information from a roadblock detainee
identifying the perpetrator of the crime.").
175. See generally United States v. Davis, 279 F.3d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
176. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.
177. Id. at425.
178. Seeid. at 423.
179. See id. at 425.
180. Davis, 270 F.3d at 982.
181. See Duncan v. United States, 629 A.2d 1, 5 n.6 (D.C. 1993) (discussing the
"'benefit from the "spin-off" effect of an otherwise constitutional law enforcement
program').
182. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) ("Our holding...
does not impair the ability of police officers to act appropriately upon information that
they properly learn during a checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary purpose, even
where such action may result in the arrest of a motorist for an offense unrelated to that
purpose.").
183. See Davis, 270 F.3d at 982 ("[F]inding the primary or predominant purpose will
often prove difficult, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Edmond."); Commonwealth
v. Buchannon, 122 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Ky. 2003) (characterizing process of identifying
checkpoints primary purpose as "particularly difficult").
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Assume, however, that in the hypothetical that opened this article a
commanding officer had established the checkpoint as a holiday sobriety
checkpoint at a high-traffic location with regular vehicular access to area
watering holes and a history of citizen complaints about drunk drivers.
Nothing suggests that the checkpoint was instituted for any reason other
than the police objective of deterring and removing drunk drivers. But,
to ensure maximum law enforcement benefit from the checkpoint, the
commanding officer directed that while one officer examines the driver
for sobriety, another officer shall examine the vehicle for evidence of
drugs, weapons, vehicle theft or other crimes by employing both drug-
sniffing dogs and visual inspections. The Supreme Court has made clear
that the Fourth Amendment has not finished regulating this checkpoint.
III. Unlawful Duration: The Fifth Circuit Establishes an Objective
Measure
In Illinois v. Lidster, the Supreme Court explained that when a
checkpoint has a lawful primary.programmatic purpose, "[t]hat does not
mean the stop is automatically, or even presumptively constitutional. It
simply means that we must judge its reasonableness, hence, its
constitutionality, on the basis of individual circumstances. ' 84 This case-
specific reasonableness inquiry can prove just as important as the
primary purpose inquiry itself at restraining police discretion during
suspicionless checkpoint inquiries.
Since Edmond, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals repeatedly has
addressed checkpoints involving a claimed secondary crime-control
objective due to the routine arrests that occur at the permanent
immigration checkpoints in Texas. Because these border checkpoints
have operated for years, little reason exists to question their lawful
primary purpose.1 85 While these Fifth Circuit cases demonstrate a trend
away from any secondary purpose analysis, they also reveal a strict
objective analysis of checkpoint duration to keep suspicionless
checkpoints from becoming defacto suspicionless criminal inquiries.
In United States v. Machuca-Barrera,86 a Border Patrol agent
184. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426. See also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 445-55 (1990), 496 U.S. at 45-55) (noting that determining reasonableness involves
the balance of several factors); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (explaining that
judging reasonableness involves "weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served
by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual liberty"). But see Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 n.17 (2001) (explaining two-part analysis in "special needs"
cases).
185. See United States v. Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 2002)
(discussing twenty-five year history of Sarita immigration checkpoint in Texas).
186. 261 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2001).
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stopped the defendant and his fellow traveler at a permanent immigration
checkpoint in Texas. 187 The agent asked the two about their travel plans
and citizenship, which both provided. 188 The agent followed by asking
whether the two carried any firearms or drugs. 189 When the defendant
said no, the agent requested consent to search the car, which the
defendant gave.19° The search revealed a large quantity of marijuana.'91
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reason to question the
primary purpose of the checkpoint of confirming citizenship status near
the border. 192 In such a case, the court concluded, "we will not scrutinize
the particular questions a Border Patrol agent chooses to ask as long as in
sum they generally relate to determining citizenship status."'193 In the
court's view, "[t]o scrutinize too closely a set of questions asked by a
Border Patrol agent would engage judges in an enterprise for which they
are ill-equipped and would court inquiry into the subjective purpose of
the officer asking the questions."' 94 Thus, the court held, "an officer may
ask questions outside the scope"'195 of a lawful checkpoint stop, even to
pursue a secondary agenda of crime control.1
96
Machuca-Barrera, notably, does focus on the individual border
patrol agent and the questions he or she elects to ask while executing a
checkpoint. 197 This decision thus arguably may not address the question
of programmatic secondary purposes at all. Rather, Machuca-Barrera
could be read as holding only that courts will not "probe the minds of
individual officers acting at the scene"'' 98 concerning their crime control
agendas, except to the extent their actions or questions clearly reveal an
actual crime-control primary purpose to the checkpoint. This
interpretation would leave open a potential challenge to programmatic
secondary crime control purposes.
In United States v. Moreno- Vargas,199 however, the Fifth Circuit
187. Id. at 429.
188. Id. at 429-30.
189. Id. at 430.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See United States v. Muchaca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 431 (5th Cir. 2001).
193. Id. at 433.
194. Id. at 434. If, however, an officer targets these secondary questions only to
persons of a particular race, the questions may warrant relief under the Equal Protection
Clause. See supra notes 39, 100.
195. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 432.
196. See id.; cf United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2002)
(repeating Machuca-Barrera's conclusion that an officer generally may ask questions
outside the scope of a lawful stop).
197. Muchaca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 433-44.
198. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
199. 315 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2002).
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made clear that a secondary programmatic purpose of crime control will
not upset an otherwise lawful checkpoint. 200  In Moreno-Vargas, the
defendant was stopped at the Sarita immigration checkpoint in Texas,
and the police found cocaine in his vehicle.20 1 The defendant contended
that "his detention at the checkpoint was illegal at its inception because
the checkpoint had a secondary programmatic purpose of drug
interdiction, as evidenced by the permanent presence of dogs cross-
trained to detect drugs as well as humans. 20 2 The court, however, noted
that the defendant did "not dispute that ... the Sarita checkpoint has as
its primary programmatic purpose the enforcement of the immigration
laws. 20 3 The court concluded that "Edmond requires no more. 20 4
The court in Moreno- Vargas explicitly adopted the reasoning of the
District of Columbia Circuit in Davis, holding that "a checkpoint is
constitutional if its primary purpose is [constitutional]., 20 5  The court
noted further that this conclusion "is likewise the necessary inference of
our Machuca-Barrera holding., 20 6 The defendant, the court observed,
"does not argue ... that the Saita checkpoint would not be maintained
were it not for the fact that the immigration stops there often result in
interdiction of drugs, nor would the evidence support any such
finding., 20 7 The court thus concluded that the "immigration stop at the
Sarita checkpoint was valid because the checkpoint had as its primary
programmatic purpose the enforcement of the immigration laws,
regardless of whether or not it could also be said to have a secondary
programmatic purpose of drug interdiction.,
20 8
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has not embraced a true secondary
200. See id at 490.
201. Seeid. at 489.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 490.
204. Id.
205. United States v. Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 2002).
206. Id.
207. Id. The court thus also embraced a similar standard to the Davis court in
assessing whether a crime control or lawful objective represents a checkpoint's primary
purpose: whether the police established the checkpoint at that locale, even if it furthered a
lawful immigration agenda, to advance a grander crime control objective. See supra
notes 146-49, 160-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Davis standard. This
standard, of course, remains distinct from the simplified but-for analysis against which
the Davis court cautioned, such as if, for instance, the Border Patrol had established the
Sarita checkpoint because border-area drug trafficking had led to vehicular safety
problems. See United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("One must be
careful not to fall into the trap of thinking that any 'but for' cause of a roadblock
represents its [true] primary purpose ... ").
208. Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d at 491; see also United States v. Chacon, 330 F.3d
323, 328 n.3 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[I]llegal drug interdiction may be carried out at
immigration checkpoints, though not as the primary purpose of those checkpoints.")
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purpose inquiry, so long as a checkpoint pursues a lawful primary
purpose demonstrably distinct from crime control. Still, the court has not
extended law enforcement a blank check to investigate motorists about
any subject it desires once a motorist is stopped at a checkpoint, even one
with a proper primary purpose. Instead, the court has focused on
whether the police have expanded a checkpoint stop's duration beyond
the scope necessary to satisfy the checkpoint's primary purpose.
In Machuca-Barrera, for instance, while the court upheld the
questioning about firearms and drugs,2 °9 the court cautioned that these
"questions [may] not extend the duration of the stop. It is the length of
the detention, not the questions asked, that makes a specific stop
unreasonable. 210  Therefore, "the permissible duration of the stop is
limited to the time reasonably necessary to complete a brief investigation
of the matter within the scope of the stop. '2 1  For example, at an
immigration checkpoint, "'[a]ny further detention beyond a brief
question or two or a request for documents evidencing a right to be in the
United States must be based on consent or probable cause.,7
212
The Fifth Circuit thus has suggested that focusing upon a
checkpoint stop's duration may provide courts with a more objective and
consistent yardstick by which to measure the reasonableness of these
stops than an inquiry into secondary purposes.2 13 The Fifth Circuit has
applied this duration analysis rather strictly, holding that delays of "even
three or five minutes beyond [a checkpoint's] justified duration" violate
the Fourth Amendment. 21 4  Nevertheless, in Machuca-Barrera, the
agent's "few questions took no more than a couple of minutes,, 215 an
209. United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 2001).
210. Id. at 432.
211. Id. at 433.
212. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2002)).
213. Cf Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 434 n.26 ("We do not inquire into the motives
of individual Border Patrol agents in performing stops. Instead, we determine whether
the stop objectively conforms to the limitations placed on the stop by its justifying
purpose." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Consider the Seventh Circuit's decision
in United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc), which states:
[C]ustody's nature and duration must be "reasonable" under the [F]ourth
[A]mendment, so we must consider the possibility, not that each [police]
question is a "seizure," but that questioning may render the physical detention
unreasonable. The best case for such a possibility would be [where] ... [a] car
is stopped at a checkpoint for a routine license-and-registration inquiry. .. and
the occupants are then detained for extra time while the police ask additional
questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop. Questioning that prolongs the
detention, yet cannot be justified by the purpose of such an investigatory stop,
is unreasonable under the [F]ourth [A]mendment.
Id. at 952 (citations omitted).
214. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 432 n.19.
215. Id. at435.
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exchange that fell "within the permissible duration of an immigration
checkpoint stop.
216
In United States v. Portillo-Aguirre,217 however, the court
218encountered a checkpoint stop of more significant duration. A Border
Patrol agent stopped a commercial bus at a permanent immigration
checkpoint in Texas.219 The defendant rode on the bus with his wife.
220
As the agent checked the documents of non-United States citizens, the
agent noticed that the defendant seemed nervous. 221 But, the defendant
satisfied the agent of his resident alien status, and the agent "continued
his inspection, which included checking the bathroom at the back of the
bus for illegal aliens or narcotics.,
222
After finishing, the agent returned toward the front of the bus and
noticed that the defendant had a small carry-on bag underneath his
seat.223 The agent did not see the bag from the front because the
defendant sat rigidly with his legs straight in front of him with a pillow
and book on his lap, all of which aroused the agent's suspicion.224 The
agent questioned the defendant again and his nervous and evasive
answers increased the Agent's suspicion.225  The agent asked for and
obtained consent to search the bag and discovered cocaine in it.
226
According to the agent, "the entire stop lasted ten minutes. 227
The Fifth Circuit again had "no doubt that the primary purpose of
the ... checkpoint [was] to investigate immigration status., 228  The
agent, however, testified that when he inspected buses, he first verified
passenger immigration status, "and then [began] looking for signs of
narcotics trafficking. ' 229 Thus, the court faced a checkpoint with a clear
216. Id.; cf Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d at 730 (upholding seizure of drugs from
defendant on bus at immigration checkpoint because "the dog alerted to the presence of
narcotics before [the border agent] had completed his questioning of the passengers on
the bus"); United States v. Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding
checkpoint stop because, inter alia, "the presence of the [drug-sniffing] dog did not affect
the duration of the stop"); United States v. Green, 293 F. 3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2002)
("The total duration of the [checkpoint] stop before probable cause to arrest [the
defendant] arose was considerably less than the three to five minutes that the Court found
minimal in Martinez-Fuerte.").
217. 311F.3d647.
218. Id. at 651.




223. United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2002).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 650-51.
227. Id. at 651.
228. Id. at 655.
229. United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2002).
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secondary purpose of drug interdiction. The court nonetheless
reaffirmed its position from Machuca-Barrera that, as a general matter,
an officer properly may ask crime control questions outside of the scope
230of a checkpoint's primary purpose. Yet, the court also reemphasized
that an officer may pursue secondary-purpose questions "only so long as
such questions do not extend the duration of the stop. '231  "[An
immigration] stop may not exceed its permissible duration unless the
officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity., 232 Otherwise, if a
police officer extends a checkpoint stop without individualized
suspicion, the court concluded, the officer's "[m]ethod [becomes]
essentially an attempt to circumvent the Court's holding in Edmond by
broadening the scope of an otherwise lawful immigration seizure to
,,233sideosrtshainclude drug interdiction activity. This analysis demonstrates that
while the Fifth Circuit answers the first question that Edmond left open
in the negative-whether a secondary crime control purpose invalidates a
checkpoint-the court also answers Edmond's second unresolved
question firmly in the negative: "whether police may expand the scope
of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order to detect the presence
of drugs in a stopped car.
234
In applying this framework, the court stressed that after determining
passenger citizenship status in the first three to five minutes, the agent
"extended the stop for an additional three to five minutes in order to
investigate whether Portillo-Aguirre was carrying illegal drugs., 23 5 The
court noted further:
[The agent's] testimony at the suppression hearing does not establish
that the initial, routine questioning of the passengers for immigration
purposes generated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Although [the agent] stated that Portillo-Aguirre seemed nervous
from the moment the agents boarded the bus, this 'generic claim of
nervousness' does not justify the extension of the stop.
23 6
The court, of course, would "not require Border Patrol agents to look the
other way when evidence of criminal activity is before them. 2 37 But, "if
an agent does not develop reasonable suspicion of such activity before
the justifying purpose of a checkpoint stop has been accomplished, he
230. Seeid. at 656.
231. Id. at 653.
232. Id. at 655.
233. Id.
234. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 n.2 (2000).
235. United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2002).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 657.
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may not prolong the stop." '238 Since the Agent did not develop
individualized suspicion prior to completing the immigration inquiry,
"Portillo-Aguirre and his fellow passengers.., should have been
permitted to leave. 239
The Fifth Circuit's focus on checkpoint duration draws upon pre-
existing case law concerning traffic stops, where courts, including the
Fifth Circuit, have held that the police may not unreasonably enlarge the
duration and scope of a lawful traffic stop beyond its initial justification
without developing cause for the extension.240 The court, however, did
comment in Portillo-Aguirre that when a checkpoint stop's duration
exceeds the length reasonably necessary to achieve its primary purpose,
"the purpose of [the] stop switches from enforcement of immigration
laws to drug interdiction, [and thus] a Fourth Amendment violation
occurs." 24' This analysis may raise some degree of confusion under
Edmond, since it suggests that courts should look for whether individual
officers' priorities have shifted during individual stops, when Edmond
directs that courts must not "probe the minds of individual officers acting
at the scene.,
242
This potential confusion, and the broad range of issues that post-
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 654-55 (citing United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 237-39 (5th Cir.
2000) and United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 195-99 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also
United States v. Kaguras, 183 F. App'x 783, 786 (10th Cir. 2006) ("A traffic stop may
not extend the stop beyond the time reasonably required to effectuate its purpose.");
United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("[A traffic stop]
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion ... emerges."); United States v. Wellman,
185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1999) ("A traffic stop is analogous to a 'Terry stop' in that,
following the initial stop, the subsequent detention cannot be excessively intrusive and
must be reasonably related in time to the investigation." (citing Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984))); United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir.
1994) (en banc) ("We consider both the length of the detention and the efforts of police to
conduct their investigation quickly and unintrusively in determining whether a detention
is reasonable in the context of an investigative stop .. "); State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435,
438 (Fla. 2003) ("[O]nce a police officer has totally satisfied the purpose for which he
has initially stopped and detained the motorist, the officer no longer has reasonable
grounds or legal basis for continuing the detention of the motorist."). But cf United
States v. Long, 320 F.3d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 2003) ("A traffic stop is not subject to
length-of-detention analysis .. "); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (rejecting application of Terry principles to traffic stops based on
probable cause, viewing such traffic stops instead as an arrest). See generally Thomas
Fusco, Annotation, Permissibility under Fourth Amendment of Detention of a Motorist by
Police, Following Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, To Investigate Matters not Related to
the Offense, 118 A.L.R. FED. 567, §§ 2, 4 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (listing authorities
addressing issue of traffic stop duration under Fourth Amendment).
241. Portillio-Aguirre, 311 F.3d at 655.
242. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,48 (2000).
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Edmond decisions and commentators have identified, all call for a clear
framework for evaluating multi-purpose checkpoints. The final section
to this article attempts to distill these authorities and analyses into
precisely such a framework.
IV. Striking a Balance: Mixing the Subjective & Objective
The authorities interpreting and applying Edmond offer a variety of
approaches for regulating multi-purpose checkpoints. One option for
evaluating them, of course, would prove simple enough: if the police
programmatically design and execute a suspicionless checkpoint to
pursue general crime control, even as a secondary objective, the
checkpoint violates the Fourth Amendment. The police under this option
may keep an eye open to, and act upon, anything suspicious as they
pursue a lawful checkpoint objective. But, the police simply cannot
devote programmatic resources to catching criminals as part of a
systematic plan of seizing motorists without individualized suspicion.
This approach has the benefit of simplicity and clarity, which are always
helpful features to a legal doctrine that depends largely on non-lawyers
to implement it-the police. This approach also would appear best able
to further an overarching principle of Edmond and the Fourth
Amendment: the police should not have the ability to seize individuals
for criminal investigation absent individualized suspicion.243
This approach, however, likely proves sorely unrealistic in the
degree to which it hamstrings the police. A prohibition on programmatic
secondary crime control agendas, for instance, should put a stop to the
police stationing drug-sniffing dogs at checkpoints, since drug sniffing
dogs obviously reflect a programmatic police effort to interdict drug-
related crime. Yet, the Supreme Court did not suggest that it had any
problem with the drug-sniffing dogs in Edmond independent of that
checkpoint's primary purpose of drug interdiction.244 To the contrary,
the Edmond majority commented:
The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the
exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not
transform the seizure into a search... [because] an exterior sniff of
243. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2203 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp
out."); cf Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886) (reviewing historical
purposes to Fourth Amendment); Hibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185-
89 (2004) (exploring the importance of individualized suspicion in validating a "stop and
identify" statute); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning whether
"the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 'reasonable' a program of
indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing").
244. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
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an automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed
to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of
narcotics... [and] a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is
"much less intrusive than a typical search. ' 2 5
Although framed in terms of whether drug-sniffing dogs turn a vehicle
seizure into a search, the Court's view of the non-effect of drug-sniffing
dogs at this checkpoint, independent of the admitted primary crime
control purpose, may reveal the Court's unspoken approval of secondary
crime-control purposes. This view comports with the analysis of stops
for traffic violations, where courts will not micromanage the substance of
police inquiries so long as they do not unreasonably enlarge the scope of
the stop beyond its initial justification,246 which drug-sniffing dogs
generally have been held not to do.247 The Supreme Court recently
embraced this position in Illinois v. Caballes, where the Court concluded
that "the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog... during a lawful
traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. 248
While analytical differences exist between for-cause stops and
suspicionless checkpoints, 249 it is hard not to imagine the carry-over of
245. Id.; see also id. at 44 n.1 ("T[he] C[hief] J[ustice's] dissent... erroneously
characterizes our opinion as holding that the 'use of drug-sniffing dogs... annuls what is
otherwise plainly constitutional under... [the] Fourth Amendment ... ' (second ellipse
in original)).
246. See supra note 233. Of course, in traffic stop cases the police have detained the
individualfor cause. No such individualized cause supports a checkpoint stop, a fact that
arguably distinguishes the character and thus reasonable scope of a checkpoint stop from
a traffic stop. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., United States v. $404,905.00, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 (1 1th Cir. 1998); United States v. Seals,
987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200,
205 (10th Cir. 1990); Lee v. Cline, 814 A.2d 86, 94 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). But
cf People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Ill. 2002) (rejecting dog sniff during routine
traffic stop, because the officer "did not have 'specific and articulable facts' justifying the
call to [another officer] for assistance and the subsequent dog-sniff test of defendant's
vehicle," noting that if the court "were [] to accept the State's contention that the dog-
sniff test was permissible, [it] would be endorsing a drug-sniff test at every stop for a
traffic violation"). In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), the United States
Supreme Court appeared to approve of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Cox. See
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08 ("We may assume that a similar result would be warranted
in this case if the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent was being unlawfully
detained."). The Supreme Court, however, focused on "the unreasonably prolonged
traffic stop" required to accommodate the dog sniff in Cox, not on the general use of
drug-sniffing dogs during simply traffic stops. See id. at 407-09.
248. 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); see also id. at 408 ("In our view, conducting a dog
sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and
otherwise executed in a reasonable manner .... ).
249. Cf United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(discussing distinction between stops at suspicionless checkpoints and stops based on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and concluding that when courts evaluate the
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one to the other. The Fifth Circuit, at least, has embraced this carry-over,
approving checkpoints that utilize drug-sniffing dogs.250
Realistically, moreover, courts tend to accommodate a little less
precision in the law to preserve greater flexibility for law enforcement,
particularly in the Fourth Amendment area.25' Thus, a more balanced,
realistic framework likely is to be embraced than a bright-line rule
banning any programmatic secondary crime control objectives. This
balance may rest in a combination of subjective and objective
components to a reasonable checkpoint.
A. The Subjective Component
Edmond establishes a subjective "primary purpose" component to a
lawful checkpoint, to be analyzed at the programmatic level where the
checkpoint's controlling guidelines are established. The premise of
Edmond appears to be that a truly primary and programmatic non-crime
control purpose adequately may limit police discretion in why, where,
when and how a checkpoint is executed as to prove reasonable, even if
the checkpoint pursues crime control as a secondary objective. Crime
control under these circumstances simply does not operate as the impetus
to suspicionless police seizures of motorists if checkpoints must be
motivated first and foremost by a distinct, non-crime control objective.
On the contrary, at the programmatic level, secondary purposes become
arguably irrelevant to why a motorist actually is detained, because the
checkpoint would not have been established but for its primary
objective.
252
nature and duration of police questioning of motorists, "[tireating checkpoint stops as if
they were Terry stops supported by reasonable suspicion gives the officers too much
discretion over drivers who arrive at roadblocks or security screening points").
250. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 703-04 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Moreno-
Vargas, 315 F.3d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2002); cf United States v. Marrufo, 183 F. App'x
650, 651-52 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding immigration checkpoint at which drug sniffing
dog was used, although during a "secondary search"). But cf Commonwealth v.
Buchannon, 122 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Ky. 2006) (rejecting checkpoint because, inter alia, of
the "presence of the drug dog at a roadblock held in mid-afternoon").
251. Cf, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 n.10 (1983) (rejecting Model
Code recommendation of twenty-minute limit on Terry stops, explaining that "[w]e
understand the desirability of providing law enforcement authorities with a clear rule to
guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.
Such a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate
their responses to the demands of any particular situation.").
252. Cf Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d at 490 ("[Defendant] does not argue.., that the
Sarita checkpoint would not be maintained were it not for the fact that the immigration
stops there often result in interdiction of drugs .... ). This framing of the issue, of
course, departs from the approach taken in many other mixed motive contexts, where
courts inquire only whether a challenged motive caused or was a substantial factor in
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For this premise to remain viable, however, the checkpoint's
subjective programmatic purpose objectively must prove primary in the
hierarchy of goals that the checkpoint pursues.2 53 Therefore, a reviewing
court's inquiry must entail a truly critical analysis of all of a checkpoint's
programmatic purposes. This critical analysis should begin with a
review of the checkpoint's resource allocation.254 The police can assert a
checkpoint's non-crime control primary purpose, but if at a sobriety
checkpoint, for instance, one officer is assigned to sobriety inspection
while five officers and three drug-sniffing dogs are assigned to inspect
vehicles for contraband, this allocation of resources speaks of a distinct
255crime control primary purpose.
Resource allocation, however, cannot end the inquiry. For, as the
Davis decision illustrates, the police may design and execute a particular
checkpoint so that it ostensibly advances non-crime control objectives.
256
But, significant and more highly prized police objectives, operating at the
policy level, in fact may motivate the checkpoint. Courts must remain
open to defense inquiries into these possible incentives to ensure that
courts do not mistakenly adopt local citizens' priorities or a checkpoint's
otherwise legitimate design as final proof of the checkpoint's primary
purpose when the police have entirely distinct primary agendas of their
own that the checkpoint advances.
To be sure, courts should not suppose a crime control primary
purpose simply because a factual relationship exists between a
checkpoint and crime-related concerns. As Lidster and McFayden
demonstrate, this type of but-for analysis oversimplifies Edmond's
subjective inquiry, particularly if, as in Lidster, the criminal inquiry
pursued by the police does not target motorists detained at the
checkpoint.257 Courts nevertheless must determine the actual primary
producing conduct, regardless of whether the motive was "primary" or "secondary." See
supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. But cf Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266,
2277 (2006) (adopting a "primary purpose" test to evaluate interrogations under
confrontation clause).
253. Cf Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (employing an objective analysis of the facts to
determine the primary purpose of interrogation).
254. Cf United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 2006) (highlighting,
inter alia, design and number of litter bags made and distributed by park rangers at an
entry checkpoint as objective proof of its asserted non-crime control primary purpose).
255. This is not to suggest that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on its own demonstrates
a primary programmatic purpose of crime control. See supra notes 9, 203 and
accompanying text. But, drug-sniffing dogs certainly do reveal a programmatic crime
control agenda, and the amount of resources dedicated to dog sniffs of detained motorists
in contrast to the stated primary agenda for the checkpoint objectively may reveal a lot
about its true primary purpose..
256. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
257. See Illinois v. Lidster. 540 U.S. 419. 423 (2004).
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police objective motivating a checkpoint. This police motivation
controls the analysis, even if the checkpoint on its face programmatically
targets seemingly acceptable objectives, such as traffic safety or sobriety.
Thus, while courts should not reject a checkpoint solely because the
police would not have established it but for the existence of some
criminal element, courts should reject a checkpoint that the police would
not have established but to further a crime control objective--even if that
crime control objective exists at a policy level seemingly removed from
the individual checkpoint. This is the "primary purpose" lesson from
Davis258 and Moreno- Vargas.
259
For example, assume the police have established a "carjacking"
checkpoint. The police launched this program because of a recent spate
of carjackings in the neighborhood that mostly have targeted taxis, but
other motorists as well. 260 At the checkpoint, the police stop vehicles to
check drivers' licenses and registration, and to provide them with safety
information about carjackings, including how to avoid and report them as
well as suspected carjacker descriptions.261 If the police launched this
258. See Davis, 270 F.3d at 982 ("One must be careful not to fall into the trap of
thinking that any 'but for' cause of a roadblock represents its primary purpose .... ); see,
e.g., Faulkner, 450 F.3d at 470-71 (rejecting argument that park entry checkpoint
primarily pursued crime control because the checkpoint partially was motivated by
complaints about criminal activity in the park including alcohol consumption; facts
objectively established that checkpoint was designed principally to inform entrants of
park rules).
259. See United States v. Moreno-Vargas, 315 F.3d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 2002)
("[Defendant] does not argue.. . that the Sarita checkpoint would not be maintained were
it not for the fact that the immigration stops there often result in interdiction of
drugs .... ").
260. Cf, e.g., People v. Abad, 771 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (N.Y. 2001) (addressing
"roving checkpoint" stops of livery cab drivers who participate in voluntary program with
objective of preventing crimes against livery cab drivers).
261. Whether a checkpoint lawfully may prioritize crime prevention as its primary
purpose through these types of measures or simply a show of police authority remains an
unresolved question. Arguably, a deterrence-based crime prevention checkpoint does not
subject detained motorists to the same degree of suspicionless criminal inquiry as a
checkpoint designed primarily to interdict crime by uncovering evidence for arrests, since
it does not target every detained motorist as a potential suspect. Lidster indicates that a
criminal inquiry by the police at a checkpoint, if it does not target the detained motorist
him or herself, may steer far enough from "general crime control" to satisfy Edmond.
See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423 ("[P]olice expected the information elicited to help them
apprehend, not the vehicle's occupants, but other individuals."); cf Abad, 771 N.E.2d at
238-39 (upholding voluntary program of roving taxi stops with objective of preventing
crimes against livery taxi drivers). Yet, unlike the information-seeking checkpoint in
Lidster, crime prevention checkpoints may be forward-looking enough, and have enough
potential to target detained motorists, as to depart from Lidster's analysis. Cf, e.g.,
People v. Trotter, 810 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (rejecting checkpoint
because it was designed "to detect and deter violent crime and drug trafficking"
(emphasis added)); State v. Hayes, 188 S.W.3d 505, 512-13 (Tenn. 2006) (rejecting entry
checkpoint to public housing complex that was designed to "prevent" crimes by
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program because the recent carjackings had contributed to erratic driving
or other traffic safety or taxi service problems in the neighborhood, the
checkpoint very likely has no primary purpose of crime control. This
fact remains so even if the police would not have established the
checkpoint but for the occurrence of these carjackings, and even though
the police may harbor the secondary hope of nabbing a few carjackers or
other criminals in the process. Indeed, this analysis would remain intact
even if the police devoted programmatic resources to this secondary
agenda-for example, by arming officers with descriptions or
photographs of wanted carjackers-so long as that secondary purpose
remains objectively secondary at the programmatic level.
If, however, the police instituted the checkpoint primarily to catch
would-be carjackers, or to allay community concerns about whether the
police are aggressively investigating these or other crimes, the
checkpoint more clearly pursues crime control as its primary purpose.
This crime control objective remains primary regardless of the fact that
the checkpoint's design and execution may emphasize and further local
vehicular safety concerns more effectively than it generates carjacking
arrests, so long as the police would not have pursued the checkpoint but
for their desire to catch criminals. Only a sensitive and comprehensive
inquiry can identify and distinguish these various police agendas,
separate them from possible community objectives, and ultimately
determine which one primarily motivated the checkpoint.
A final key to this subjective inquiry is proof that the checkpoint
program did not give the executing officers discretion to reprioritize the
program's objectives. Edmond properly restricts the purpose inquiry to
the programmatic level, but this restriction maintains its logic only if a
checkpoint's objectives are defined at the programmatic level.262 Like
the court in Jackson,263 therefore, courts should expect the prosecution to
provide a meaningful programmatic paper trial that objectively
establishes a checkpoint's objectives and that kept individual officers at
the scene from substituting their own agendas for those of the actual
checkpoint program.264
trespassers). A deterrence checkpoint also may fall under the "pubic safety" exception to
individualized suspicion. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424-25 ("Like certain other forms of
police activity, say, crowd control or public safety, an information-seeking stop is not the
kind of event that involves suspicion, or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.").
This hypothetical does not purport to resolve this question.
262. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,48 (2000).
263. People v. Jackson, 782 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 2002).
264. This inquiry does not mean that courts should inquire into individual officer
motives, contrary to Edmond's command. On the contrary, a court reviewing a
checkpoint never should get there. If the checkpoint program's objectives are not firmly
prioritized at the programmatic level, and individual officers are left to decide what
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B. The Objective Component
A checkpoint's validity under Edmond also depends upon an
objective component; a non-crime control primary purpose does not end
the inquiry.26 5 Checkpoint stops, like any police seizure, must prove
reasonable from their inception to their conclusion, regardless of police
266officers' subjective motivations. A proper primary purpose
implemented under neutral checkpoint guidelines generally will make a
checkpoint stop reasonable at its inception.26 7 Yet, if the checkpoint also
pursues a secondary crime control agenda, the police will want to satisfy
this secondary programmatic objective before releasing individual
motorists. What happens if this secondary purpose extends a checkpoint
stop beyond the duration necessary to satisfy the lawful primary
objective? Edmond expressly left this question open.2 68
The question, however, leads to the Fifth Circuit's decisions
emphasizing duration.269 Although the court suggested that its duration
analysis may focus on whether crime control objectives have supplanted
a checkpoint's lawful primary purpose during a particular stop,2 70 such
an analysis may conflict with Edmond's command that courts examine
police motives only at the programmatic level, and not during individual
stops. 271 The Fifth Circuit's duration analysis, however, can be viewed
objectives to prioritize when executing the checkpoint. In that case, the prosecution has
not objectively established a non-crime control primary purpose at the programmatic
level; no inquiry of what the individual officers thought is necessitated. See supra notes
36-39, 97-99 and accompanying text.
265. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426-27.
266. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427; United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466, 470 (9th
Cir. 2006); cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (searches in school setting
require reasonableness in all circumstances); United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651,
656 (6th Cir. 1999) ("To determine whether a detention is reasonable, the court should
consider 'whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it is
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place."' (quoting United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1996) and
citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))).
267. See generally Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
268. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 n.2 (2000) ("[W]e express no
view on the question whether police may expand the scope of a license or sobriety
checkpoint seizure in order to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.").
269. See infra note 292.
270. See United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that when a checkpoint stop's duration exceeds the length reasonably
necessary to achieve its primary purpose, "the purpose of [the] stop switches from
enforcement of immigration laws to drug interdiction").
271. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 ("[T]he purpose inquiry in this context is to be
conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of
individual officers acting at the scene."); cf United States v. Bond, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2
(2000) (finding officer's subjective intent irrelevant in determining whether actions
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in more objective terms: once the police discharge a checkpoint's
primary purpose, such as a sobriety check, they no longer have any
objective, programmatic basis for detaining the motorist, absent
individual suspicion or consent.272 Secondary crime control objectives,
while lawful, cannot justify any extension of the stop, since they could
not justify the stop in the first place-indeed, in the first place they
would make the stop presumptively unconstitutional under Edmond.
Thus, as only the checkpoint's primary programmatic purpose can justify
the stop, only that primary objective can define the reasonableness of the
stop's duration. If the police are curious about anything else beyond the
checkpoint's primary objective, they must satisfy their curiosity before
they finish investigating that primary objective.
This principle may seem rather obvious. Indeed, it mirrors the
general Fourth Amendment principle that typically limits police
investigative detentions, where courts do not allow the police to extend
such detentions beyond the duration necessary to investigate the basis for
the stop.273  Yet, in application, and particularly when joined with a
violate the Fourth Amendment); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996)
(holding that in most Fourth Amendment contexts, "subjective intentions play no role
in ... [the] analysis").
272. New Jersey has departed from the traditional rule and held that:
[U]nless there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid
motor vehicle stop ... any further detention to effectuate a consent search is
unconstitutional. A suspicionless consent search shall be deemed
unconstitutional whether it preceded or followed completion of the lawful
traffic stop... [and is a rule designed to] prevent[] the police from turning a
routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition....
State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 912 (N.J. 2002). Carty is part of a series of decisions from
the New Jersey Supreme Court heightening the protections of New Jersey motorists. See,
e.g., State v. Eckel, 888 A.2d 1266, 1268-77 (N.J. 2006) (rejecting application of search
incident to arrest exception permitting search of a motor vehicle when arrested occupants
have been removed from vehicle and secured in police custody, expressly departing from
the U.S. Supreme Court's rule under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)); State v.
Segars, 799 A.2d 541, 549 (N.J. 2002) ("[I]f race is the sole motivation underlying [a
police investigation], it is illegal and the evidence resulting from a subsequent stop must
be suppressed."). Perhaps this series of decisions is an unspoken judicial response to the
sharp criticisms of police practices on New Jersey's roads, especially in relation to
minority motorists. See Rick Hepp, Finding of No Profiling by Troopers Spurs Question:
Governor's Panel Wants 'Below the Surface' Review of Disciplinary Cases, N.J. STAR-
LEDGER, Nov. 14, 2006, at 28 (discussing shooting of unarmed minority motorists in New
Jersey).
273. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) ("[Courts must] examine
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm
or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
defendant."); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (emphasizing that "an
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop"); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)
([T]he brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally
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robust model for identifying the checkpoint's primary purpose,274 this
duration principle effectively will restrict police authority at a checkpoint
to the checkpoint's non-crime control purpose, especially if courts adhere
to it as strictly as the Fifth Circuit apparently has.
The Fifth Circuit's decisions indicate that the police rarely can
justify anything but extremely brief stops at most checkpoints to further a
checkpoint's primary purpose.275 For example, the court has noted that
at an immigration checkpoint, "'further detention beyond a brief question
or two or a request for documents evidencing a right to be in the United
States must be based on consent or probable cause. ' ' ,2 76  The same
limiting principle should apply to other checkpoints: a brief question or
two to assess driver sobriety, or a quick verification of license and
registration documentation. This limited permissible scope to checkpoint
stops reflects the distinct character of checkpoint stops from other
roadway detentions, such as traffic stops. Unlike a checkpoint stop, a
traffic stop involves a detention for cause: the detaining officer has
observed the motorist violate some traffic law. This individualized cause
justifies more extended inquiries and thus delays, so that the officer can
ran computer checks for license status, registration and insurance or
outstanding warrants, ask the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle for
questioning, and issue citations. 277 Even these relatively brief delays,
intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in assessing
the effect of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the police
diligently pursue their investigation.).
See also authorities cited supra note 240.
274. See generally supra § II(B).
275. See Fifth Circuit decisions cited supra note 240.
276. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2002)).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 320 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing United
States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2002)) ("An officer at a traffic stop can
check the driver's identification and vehicle registration, ask the driver to step out of his
vehicle, and ask routine questions concerning the driver's destination and the purpose of
his trip."); United States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2002) ("An officer
making a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment by asking the driver his
destination and purpose, checking the license and registration, or requesting the driver to
step over to the patrol car .... A police officer may undertake similar questioning of the
vehicle's occupants to verify the information provided by the driver." (citations
omitted)); United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[A]n officer
can lawfully detain the driver of a vehicle until after the officer has finished making radio
record checks and issuing a citation .. "); United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1170
(8th Cir. 1998) ("After stopping the truck for the traffic violation, [the officer] properly
asked questions reasonably related to the stop, including requests for identification and
registration and questions relating to presence in the area, destination and purpose."
(citing United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998)); People v. Cox, 782
N.E.2d 275, 281 (Ill. 2002) (holding that upon making a lawful traffic stop, "[t]he officer
may perform some initial inquiries, check the driver's license, and conduct a speedy
warrant check").
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however, are not justified at checkpoints where individuals are not
stopped upon individualized suspicion, but pursuant to a programmatic
scheme addressing very narrow police objectives.278
The impact of this distinction in limiting suspicionless checkpoint
detentions can be seen in the extent to which courts have constrained the
police in expanding even for-cause traffic stops to incorporate unrelated
criminal inquiries. 279  For example, in People v. Cox, 280 the Illinois
Supreme Court deemed a traffic stop unlawful where the officer waited
fifteen minutes for a drug-sniffing dog while he checked the driver's
documents and issued a citation. 281  The officer had stopped the
defendant for driving without a rear registration light.282 The court noted
that "[w]hile we will not impose a rigid time limitation on the duration of
a traffic stop, we are concerned with the duration of the traffic stop in the
present case.... [T]he record leads us to conclude this was a routine
traffic stop, which should have resulted in a correspondingly abbreviated
detention. 283 Accordingly, the court concluded, "defendant's detention,
considered in light of the scope and purpose of the traffic stop, was
overly long., 284 If fifteen minutes can exceed the proper duration of a
"routine" traffic stop, substantially less time would seem reasonable to
pursue the more limited scope and programmatic purpose of a
suspicionless checkpoint stop.
Courts, therefore, must exercise vigilance to ensure that checkpoint
detentions do not exceed the scope of the limited purpose initially
justifying these suspicionless seizures. This vigilance, moreover, does
not require judicial assessment of the motives of individual officers
acting at the scene, which Edmond deems irrelevant.285 Rather, it focuses
on whether the duration of the stop objectively exceeded the limited
278. Cf. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(discussing distinction between stops at suspicionless checkpoints and stops based on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and concluding that "[tireating checkpoint stops
as if they were Terry stops supported by reasonable suspicion gives the officers too much
discretion over drivers who arrive at roadblocks or security screening points").
279. See authorities cited supra note 277.
280. 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002).
281. See id. 280.
282. See id. at 277.
283. Id. at 280 (citations omitted).
284. Id. at 281; accord Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 407-08 (2005) (citing favorably
to Cox's analysis). Butcf United States v. Long, 320 F.3d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 2003) ("We
recognize that the line that separates a traffic stop from an investigative stop is generally
difficult to draw and artificial," and "[w]e therefore put no great stock in using this line as
the basis for our conclusion as to the stop's reasonableness." (citing United States v.
$404,905.00, 182 F.3d 643, 648, 649 (8th Cir. 1999))).
285. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) ("[T]he purpose
inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an
invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene.").
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programmatic purpose that justified a suspicionless seizure in the first
place. If the police in the pursuit of other goals have extended a
checkpoint's scope beyond that reasonable necessary to achieve its
justifying objective, the checkpoint simply no longer remains reasonable
unless new, individualized facts warrant this extended detention.286
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit repeatedly has held that delays of "even
three or five minutes beyond [a checkpoint's] justified duration" violate
the Fourth Amendment. 287 For instance, in Portillo-Aguirre,288 the court
found that the Border Patrol Agent unlawfully extended the immigration
checkpoint stop of the defendant when "the entire stop lasted about ten
minutes., 289 This checkpoint in Portillo-Aguirre involved a bus full of
individuals whom the Agent needed to investigate as a group.290 Thus,
the Agent in each case could not release anyone until he had finished
checking everyone on the bus, even if he checked each person quickly.291
In the more common checkpoint cases-such as sobriety, license and
registration and other vehicle safety checkpoints-the police address
vehicles carrying smaller numbers of passengers than a bus. Moreover,
generally only the driver must be examined to satisfy the checkpoint's
primary purpose. Therefore, if in Portillo-Aguirre the court found the
ten-minute detention to inquire of an entire buss full of passengers
excessive, significantly far less time should exceed the time needed to
investigate and release motorists at most checkpoints.292
In United States v. Ellis,293 the Fifth Circuit confirmed that a
uniquely strict duration analysis applies to checkpoint seizures, limited to
286. See United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 657 (5th Cir. 2002)
("[U]nless something occurred while [the agent] was returning to the front of the bus that
raised reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, thereby justifying his extension of the
stop, [the defendant] and his fellow passengers.., should have been permitted to
leave.").
287. United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 432 n.19 (5th Cir. 2001), cf
United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 240-41 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding traffic stop duration
unlawful when officers detained defendants for three additional minutes after determining
they had clean records before obtaining consent to search); United States v. Dortch, 199
F.3d 193, 195-99 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding five-minute extension of traffic stop unlawful
when officer stopped defendant for traveling too close to another vehicle so that drug-
sniffing dog could arrive).
288. 311 F.3d 647.
289. Id.at 651.
290. See id. at 650.
291. Even still, the officer in Portillo-Aguirre testified that "an immigration
inspection of a passenger bus normally lasts three to five minutes." Id. at 656.
292. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004) (checkpoint duration
approximatly ten to fifteen seconds); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
448 (1990) (checkpoint duration of twenty-five seconds); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547 (1976) (three to five minutes); United States v. Faulkner, 450
F.3d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 2006) (twenty seconds, absent motorist questions).
293. 330 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2003).
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the narrow primary purpose justifying the suspicionless checkpoint.2 94 In
Ellis, a Border Patrol Agent checked bus passengers at an immigration
checkpoint.295 Upon reaching the rear of the bus, the Agent "had assured
himself that all passengers on board were legally in the United States.2 96
As the Agent proceeded to the front of the bus to exit, however, he
"squeezed and sniffed" luggage along the way to check for drugs. 297 The
Agent detected drugs in luggage that he ultimately connected to Ellis.
298
The district court upheld the search, and on appeal, the Government
argued that the additional delay imposed by the Agent's "squeeze and
sniff' procedure proved "trivial," perhaps adding a minute or two to the
time the Agent otherwise would have taken to exit andrelease the bus.299
The court firmly rejected this argument:
[A]llowing the Border Patrol to routinely tack on otherwise
impermissible drug interdiction [action] was "essentially an attempt
to circumvent the [Supreme] Court's holding in Edmond....
... [O]ur discussion in Machuca-Barrera demonstrates that the
"trivial delay" rule does not survive the Supreme Court's decision in
Edmond, at least insofar as it would apply to suspicionless drug
interdiction. Machuca-Barrera, in harmonizing Edmond and
Martinuez-Fuerte, made plain the bounds of suspicionless
immigration stops and laid the foundation for Portillo-Aguirre.
300
The court's analysis in Ellis reveals the critical importance of a
narrow and strict duration rule at checkpoints :301 Edmond tells us that
suspicionless seizures are the exception, not the norm, under the Fourth
Amendment, and thus the programmatic bases for suspicionless seizures
upheld by the Supreme Court must be enforced strictly 302-more strictly
than with stops predicated upon reasonable suspicion. °3 Otherwise the
294. See id. at 680 (citing United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 434 (5th
Cir. 2001)).




299. See United States v. Ellis, 330 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2003).
300. Id. at 680-81 (citations omitted).
301. See id.
302. See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
303. Compare United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(discussing distinction between stops at suspicionless checkpoints and stops based on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and concluding that "[tireating checkpoint stops
as if they were Terry stops supported by reasonable suspicion gives the officers too much
discretion over drivers who arrive at roadblocks or security screening points") with
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police, armed with the unrestrained ability to enforce even "trivial"
additional delays upon motorists suspected of no wrongdoing, can
systematically subject all motorists to suspicionless criminal inquiry
wholly independent of the checkpoint's principal, non-crime control
purpose.
C. The Subjective and Objective in Application
The hypothetical that opened this article illustrates each of these
premises drawn from Edmond. The police stopped the couple at a
checkpoint advertised as a sobriety checkpoint. The checkpoint's
apparent primary purpose of validating driver sobriety comported with
Edmond and its antecedents. Moreover, the fact that the police
programmatically assigned a secondary crime control objective to this
sobriety checkpoint-by inspecting the vehicle with a drug-sniffing dog
and a flashlight, and asking one or two drug-related questions-on its
own should not upset the checkpoint's programmatic validity. But, each
of these conclusions depends upon judicial findings that: (1) driver
sobriety inspection objectively and primarily motivated the police to
establish the checkpoint; (2) the police programmatically prioritized
sobriety inspection over crime control inquiries; and (3) the police did
not even briefly expand the checkpoint stop beyond the scope reasonably
necessary to conduct a sobriety check.
If, for instance, the evidence revealed that the police used
community complaints about drunk driving as a reason to place the
checkpoint at a plum location to investigate suspected drug activity, the
checkpoint improperly may have crime control as its primary purpose,
even if the checkpoint effectively promoted driver sobriety. Whether the
police programmatically assigned disparate checkpoint resources to
crime control inquiries-such as by having multiple officers handling
dogs and flashlight inspections of each car while a single officer checks
driver sobriety3°4-- objectively may reveal whether the checkpoint was
"primarily" a sobriety checkpoint. The point is that a checkpoint's true
principal objective cannot be revealed unless the court permits inquiry
into the full police objectives that may have motivated the checkpoint,
which may rest in evidence far more diffuse than simply the testimony of
United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[D]og sniffs that occur
within a short time following the completion of a traffic stop are not constitutionally
prohibited if they constitute only de minimis intrusions on the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights." (emphasis added) (citing United States v. $404,905.00, 182 F.3d
643, 649 (8th Cir. 1999))).
304. Cf, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buchannon, 122 S.W.3d 565, 569, 570 (Ky. 2003)
(emphasizing that only one of several checkpoint officers was trained in DUI detection at
a checkpoint that utilized a drug-sniffing dog).
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police officers working the checkpoint.
Even if sobriety inspection primarily motivated institution of the
checkpoint, the checkpoint still may not objectively prioritize that
purpose as primary. If the checkpoint's design left too much discretion
to executing officers about how to prioritize its different objectives,
including crime control, the checkpoint programmatically may not have
prioritized a non-crime control objective. This analysis holds true even
if, in executing the checkpoint, the officers actually prioritized sobriety
inspection, since under Edmond, the motives of individual officers are
irrelevant. 30 5 The purpose inquiry addresses purely the checkpoint's
programmatic objectives; if the checkpoint left actual prioritization of the
program's objectives to the executing officers, the program would fail
objectively to prioritize sobriety inspection as its primary purpose.
Finally, even if this checkpoint survives a programmatic
examination, its execution still must be considered. If the police, for
instance, passed quickly and unobtrusively around the couple's vehicle
with the dog and flashlight while an officer asked a brief question or two
of the driver or checked his license, and released them promptly upon
finishing the sobriety inquiry, the checkpoint likely presents no problem.
This delay would remain reasonably consistent with the limited primary
purpose of the checkpoint, and would not detain the couple unreasonably
beyond the sobriety inquiry. In the introductory hypothetical, however,
the police completed their sobriety examination first, and then made the
couple wait so they could ask drug-related questions and inspect the
vehicle with the dog and flashlight. This delay, even if just a few
minutes in duration, held the couple in police custody beyond the time
needed to fulfill the checkpoint's limited programmatic purpose: a driver
sobriety check. The problem arises if the police instead had pursued an
unreasonably extended sobriety inquiry of the driver to give other
officers a fuller opportunity to inspect the vehicle and the couple for
criminality. Either way, the police unreasonably have extended the
stop's duration beyond its very limited justification as a suspicionless
seizure, and the checkpoint effectively has become a suspicionless
criminal inquiry.
V. Conclusion
Checkpoints have presented courts with a difficult tension.
Checkpoints further important law enforcement objectives and have
come to be understood as a limited but expected condition of public
roadway usage. Yet, in the potential breadth of police action that
305. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
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checkpoints authorize without individualized suspicion, they seem far
disconnected from traditional Fourth Amendment principles. Perhaps
this tension explains why the Supreme Court in Edmond authorized
inquiry into police motives, something it generally has eschewed in its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This trade-off simply may have
struck the Court as reasonable in the end. As a condition to broad police
authority to detain motorists without individualized suspicion, the
objectives motivating the detentions will be scrutinized to ensure that
checkpoints are not abused as vehicles for more wide-ranging law
enforcement investigations. Hopefully courts will continue to view
Edmond, not as an obstacle to effective and "routine" police actions, but
rather as a critical restraint on police action otherwise unrestrained by the
presence of individualized suspicion, "the very evil the Fourth
Amendment was intended to stamp out.
30 6
306. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2203 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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